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PRIVACY, PRESS, AND THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
Amy Gajda* 
Abstract: When the European Court of Justice in effect accepted a Right to Be Forgotten 
in 2014, ruling that a man had a right to privacy in his past economic troubles, many suggested 
that a similar right would be neither welcomed nor constitutional in the United States given 
the Right’s impact on First Amendment-related freedoms. Even so, a number of state and 
federal courts have recently used language that embraces in a normative sense the 
appropriateness of such a Right. These court decisions protect an individual’s personal history 
in a press-relevant way: they balance individual privacy rights against the public value of older 
truthful information and decide at times that privacy should win out. In other words, they 
recognize that an individual whose embarrassing past has been revealed by another can sue for 
invasion of privacy in the United States, even when the historic information was once public. 
This Article explores Right to Be Forgotten-sensibilities in United States jurisprudence and 
suggests that such a Right has a foundation in historical case law and present-day statutes. It 
argues that the legal conception of privacy in one’s past may have some limited practical and 
important purposes but warns that any Right to Be Forgotten must be cabined effectively by 
presuming newsworthiness—a word defined similarly in law and journalism—in order to 
protect significant and competing First Amendment interests at a time when people in high 
places have vowed to curb press freedoms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, a man in Pennsylvania filed an emergency request for an 
injunction against two websites.1 The websites had suggested both that the 
man had a criminal record and that he was a participant in the federal 
witness protection program.2 In response, a state trial court ordered that 
the websites be “immediately take[n] down, disable[d], and remove[d]” 
from the internet.3 
A few months later, after the defendant publisher appealed the order as 
an unconstitutional restraint, the court decided that the websites could 
remain online as long as the publisher removed any mention of the 
plaintiff’s involvement in witness protection and any mention of his 
criminal history.4 Revelations about the plaintiff’s criminal past and his 
alleged participation in any protection program were so strongly invasive 
of personal privacy, the court suggested, that the First Amendment 
presumption against prior restraints did not apply: “[t]he United States 
Supreme Court,” the judge hearing the case wrote, “has long held that 
freedom of speech, as guaranteed by the First Amendment, does not 
include all modes of communication of ideas” but must be balanced 
against other interests, including the privacy protection of individuals.5 
Moreover, the court reasoned, under Pennsylvania law, the disclosure 
of certain once-public information could be punished and prohibited when 
                                                     
1. Hartzell v. Cummings, No. 150103764, 2015 WL 7301962, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 4, 2015). 
2. Id. at *4. 
3. Id. at *1. 
4. Id.  
5. Id. at *3. 
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a person’s “personal security” was at issue.6 The long-ago crime, the court 
wrote, did not make the plaintiff a present public figure: the plaintiff did 
not live his current life in the limelight of politics or celebrity, “and the 
details about his past [were] likely not newsworthy twenty-five years after 
the fact.”7 Similarly, the information about the plaintiff’s alleged 
assignment in years past to a witness protection program had “no relation 
to any public concern” and any relevant revelation was “personal, private, 
and illegal.”8 The court then ordered that any information regarding the 
man’s past be wiped off the websites.9 
Just a few months later, a federal trial court in Washington, D.C. kept 
information regarding a former prosecutor’s alleged misconduct out of 
public hands, expressing similar concerns that the present release of past 
information could harm the individual.10 In that case, however, the 
potential danger seemed limited to the individual’s career: “without 
question,” the court wrote, the former prosecutor “has a strong interest in 
avoiding decades-old disclosures”11 and, in contrast, the public “has only 
a negligible need to know about a largely unremarkable, decades-old 
disciplinary proceeding” involving a man who was a public servant at the 
time of the underlying investigation.12 
Both of these recent decisions and others like them suggest that at least 
some modern courts believe that individuals in the United States should 
be able to keep their past histories private under certain conditions. In 
short, they suggest that a Right to Be Forgotten—the notion that one 
should have some right to privacy in one’s past and have some legal 
remedy should that past be revealed—exists in modern United States 
jurisprudence, a troubling notion given the First Amendment and press 
freedoms. 
This Article warns that these recent decisions are not anomalies and 
that a Right to Be Forgotten effectively has been a part of United States 
law since at least the dawn of privacy—from an 1890 law review article 
titled The Right to Privacy13 and even before. The Article proceeds in 
                                                     
6. Id. at *4. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at *7. 
9. Id. It is true that the claim at issue was defamation and that, indeed, the state had issued a 
document that the individual was not involved in witness protection. The court’s opinion, however, 
seems purposefully vague and broad enough to suggest a case in which the information revealed is, 
in fact, truthful.  
10. Bloomgarden v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 12-0843, 2016 WL 471251, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 
2016). 
11. Id. at *4. 
12. Id. at *5. 
13. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
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three parts. First, it explores the history of privacy in the United States and 
Right to Be Forgotten-like language and holdings included in older cases 
and legal commentary. Second, it collects a surprising number of modern 
cases from United States courts, including the nation’s highest court, that 
support the idea that a Right to Be Forgotten exists on U.S. shores. This 
second Part also notes longstanding Right to Be Forgotten-relevant 
protections springing from statutory sources in state and federal law. 
Finally, given this seemingly strong and troubling foundation for a Right 
to Be Forgotten in the United States and what appears to be increasing 
acceptance of such a Right in modern times, including court decisions that 
order publishers to remove posted information, it argues that the Right 
must be cabined by presuming newsworthiness, a word defined in 
journalism’s ethics codes in a way that parallels at least in some part the 
legal standard. Without such limitation, any Right to Be Forgotten will 
significantly erode freedom of the press. 
I. A HISTORY OF PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT TO BE 
FORGOTTEN IN THE UNITED STATES 
In 2014, the European Court of Justice decided that a man in Spain had 
the right to wipe his long-ago financial woes off the internet.14 The 
plaintiff, Mario Costeja González, complained that the continuing online 
existence of a newspaper article about his debt proceedings ten years 
earlier limited his ability to turn his life around after getting out of debt.15 
The court sided with González finding that he had the right to the removal 
of pieces of information about his past that were “inadequate, irrelevant 
or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to th[e] purposes [for which 
they were processed] and in the light of the time that has elapsed.”16 
In other words, the man had what some have called a Right to Be 
Forgotten or, less succinctly put, a right to put one’s embarrassing and 
hurtful history behind him, at least with regard to a Google search. 
Scholars now suggest that the European court’s decision created a “Right 
                                                     
14. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 
2014 EUR-Lex CELEX 62012CJ0131 21 (May 13, 2014), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0131 [https://perma.cc/4DA4-DFA4]. 
15. Id. at 6. 
16. Id. at 19. 
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to Erasure”17 or a “Right to Delisting”18 in Europe, which had already 
protected privacy in the past and had punished privacy-invading 
revelations.19 
The precise definitions for each of those phrases is less important than 
what the court embraced: the right to have one’s past wiped away because 
of who the person has become. Ultimately, then, a Right to Be Forgotten 
at least in some sense is what the court’s decision recognizes. It suggests 
that an individual’s past history may indeed not be relevant to the person 
of today; that past information may inadequately describe the person an 
individual has become; and that an embarrassing history could be relied 
upon to excess by someone who once knew an individual’s present 
persona alone. The right of a past individual to be forgotten by people in 
the present seems precisely what the European court suggested was 
needed and appropriate. 
After the decision, news media in the United States immediately 
suggested that a similar outcome would not be possible here. A New York 
Times article that year reflects what many suggested: 
Ever since Europe’s highest court made the privacy ruling in 
May, Google has fought to limit the impact of the decision to its 
European operations, where an individual’s right to privacy is 
often on par with freedom of expression. The opposite is true in 
the United States.20 
The suggestion that a Right to Be Forgotten was incompatible with 
United States jurisprudence was put even more clearly by the 
Philadelphia Inquirer: 
                                                     
17. See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, The Right to Erasure: Privacy, Data Brokers, and the Indefinite 
Retention of Data, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 433, 435 (2014) (arguing that “protecting privacy 
interests of data subjects requires regulation on the length of time and purposes for which businesses 
can retain electronic information”).  
18. See, e.g., W. Gregory Voss & Céline Castets-Renard, Proposal for an International Taxonomy 
on the Various Forms of the “Right to be Forgotten”: A Study on the Convergence of Norms, 14 
COLO. TECH. L.J. 281, 298 (2016). 
19. A more expansive Right to Be Forgotten exists in Europe beyond erasure and delisting. The 
European Convention on Human Rights Article 8, a provision titled “Right to respect for private and 
family life,” necessarily embraces privacy in the past beyond internet erasure and delisting. European 
Convention on Human Rights art. 8, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. “Moreover,” the European 
Court of Human Rights wrote in 2000, “public information can fall within the scope of private life 
where it is systematically collected and stored in files held by the authorities. That is all the truer 
where such information concerns a person’s distant past.” Rotaru v. Romania, 2000-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 
111, 128. 
20. Mark Scott, French Official Campaigns to Make ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Global, N.Y. TIMES: 
BITS (Dec. 3, 2014, 3:20 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/french-official-campaigns-
to-make-right-to-be-forgotten-global/ [https://perma.cc/VJ9Y-QMYN]. 
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Do we have a “right to be forgotten”? Nope. 
They do now in Europe. But will this “right” cross the Atlantic? 
Not likely.21 
The United States does, after all, have the First Amendment and its 
promise of press freedom.22 And yet this Article provides evidence that 
the essential elements of a Right to Be Forgotten have been a part of both 
U.S. common law and statutory law for decades, in spite of constitutional 
protections for the publication of truthful information. 
The Right to Be Forgotten, then, has no need to cross the Atlantic; in 
some ways, it has been on U.S. shores for centuries. In a surprising 
number of cases, past and present courts have weighed privacy interests 
against press interests and have decided that privacy wins out. 
It is worth noting here that the birthdate of privacy law is a matter of 
some dispute. Many believe that privacy law began in 1890 when Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis published The Right to Privacy,23 a Harvard 
Law Review article that criticized the press of the day for publishing 
embarrassing tidbits about individuals and suggested that most 
individuals should have the right to be “let alone.”24 
But privacy sensibilities, and, notably here, a Right to be Forgotten type 
of privacy, had existed even before 1890 in U.S. law. 25 
The “Publicity Given to Private Life” section in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts provides evidence of these longstanding sensibilities.26 
It suggests that liability is appropriate if a publisher reveals secrets about 
another’s private life as long as the revelation “would be highly offensive 
to a reasonable person” and “is not of legitimate concern to the public.”27 
In other words, the Restatement suggests that the publication of truthful 
                                                     
21. John Timpane, Can the Internet Learn to Forget?, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 28, 2014, at A3. 
22. There is disagreement over the expansiveness of the First Amendment, of course. Compare 
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right 
to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2000) (arguing that “broader 
information privacy rules are not easily defensible under existing free speech law”), with Neil 
Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1151 (2005) 
(positing that arguments such as Volokh’s “overstate the First Amendment issues at stake in the 
context of most database regulation proposals, because such proposals are not regulation of anything 
within the ‘freedom of speech’ protected by the First Amendment”). 
23. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 13. 
24. Id. at 195. 
25. A few of these cases are highlighted later in this section. See also Amy Gajda, Privacy Before 
the Right to Privacy: Truthful Libel and the Earliest Underpinnings of Privacy in the United States 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
27. Id. 
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information can be punished as long as the information would be highly 
offensive and not “newsworthy” to an average member of the public with 
decent standards.28 Analogous to any Right to be Forgotten, the 
Restatement states that individuals have some right to privacy in their 
past. “Every individual has some phases of his life . . . and some facts 
about himself that he does not expose to the public eye,” the Second 
Restatement reads in its definition for private life.29 
More specifically, the authors note that such private information can 
include “some of his past history that he would rather forget.”30 
Later, after suggesting that a lapse of time is something to be 
considered in determining whether an individual has a privacy action 
against an entity or a person who reveals information in an older public 
record31—a publication that in the authors’ opinion may well satisfy the 
elements of the publication-of-private-facts tort—the Second Restatement 
offers a surprising example springing from Les Miserables: 
Jean Valjean, an ex-convict who was convicted and served a 
sentence for robbery, has changed his name, concealed his 
identity, and for twenty years has led an obscure, respectable and 
useful life in another city far removed. B Newspaper, with the 
help of Police Inspector Javert, ferrets out Jean Valjean’s past 
history and publishes it, revealing his present identity to the 
community. As a result, Jean Valjean’s life and career are ruined. 
This may be but is not definitely an invasion of privacy of Jean 
Valjean.32 
Such a revelation of a criminal past, the Restatement authors explain, 
raises a “quite different problem” from current news coverage of crime.33 
The former reveals the current identity and present location of an 
individual who has changed his criminal ways and who might, therefore, 
be more deserving of his privacy in order to facilitate rehabilitation.34 
Importantly, this seems to include privacy in information that was once 
public. 
Like the Google Spain court, the Restatement thus suggests that 
important privacy interests arise when older public records are published 
about someone who has “resumed the private, lawful and unexciting life 
                                                     
28. Id. 
29. Id. at cmt. b. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at cmt. k. 
32. Id. at illus. 26 (emphasis added). 
33. Id. at cmt. k. 
34. Id.  
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led by the great bulk of the community.”35 Moreover, it seems, the 
Restatement authors believed that additional information regarding the 
individual’s “present location and identity” should strengthen privacy 
claims.36 “[H]is new life is utterly ruined by revelation of a past that he 
has put behind him,” the Restatement reads in its suggestion that 
rehabilitated criminals, very likely a class with greater notoriety than 
those who faced bankruptcy, deserve privacy protection.37 Perhaps the 
Restatement authors did not realize that Jean Valjean in Les Miserables 
had become a mayor and, therefore, was a public official to boot; perhaps 
they did. 
This Right to Be Forgotten-like language in the Second Restatement, 
an important part of the current foundation of privacy law in the United 
States, was not created out of thin air. In fact, it is likely that the Second 
Restatement authors acknowledged the potential importance of such a 
Right because it had existed in U.S. law for decades.38 
Even before 1890, when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published 
The Right to Privacy,39 some courts had held that individuals have a right 
to privacy in embarrassing past information and, accordingly, that those 
who publish it can be held accountable. 
Consider a case from Louisiana decided in 1884.40 There, the defendant 
had published a pamphlet suggesting that a priest had had numerous 
affairs with nuns, students, and others over the course of twenty-five 
years.41 The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the defendant publisher’s 
conviction for publishing that information, finding that even if the 
information were true, jurors could well find that the information had been 
published for less than “good motives and justifiable ends.”42 Using 
language that literally included the word “forgotten,” the court noted 
specifically that past acts—including criminal acts—should be cloaked in 
                                                     
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Note here that the authors rely on common law in their formulation of the Restatement 
provisions. 
39. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23.  
40. State v. Bienvenu, 36 La. Ann. 378 (La. 1884).  
41. Id. at 378–79 (author translation). The pamphlet stated:  
[F]or over twenty-five years, the Rev. Cyprien Venissat, by indecent and notorious acts 
and other prurient acts attested to by eyewitnesses, has violated his vows of chastity and 
has become a subject of shame, scorn and scandal . . . We hereby declare that [he] is guilty 
of touching, caressing, embracing and indecently kissing the students and nuns of his 
convent and other women. He is also guilty of seduction and adultery.  
42. Id. at 382 (author translation). 
10 - Gajda.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2018 11:16 AM 
2018] PRIVACY, PRESS, AND THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 209 
 
privacy, even in a case involving a priest presumably well known to the 
community: 
Indeed, that would be a barbarous doctrine which would grant to 
the evil-disposed the liberty of ransacking the lives of others to 
drag forth and expose follies, faults or crimes long since forgotten, 
and perhaps expiated by years of remorse and sincere reform, 
with no other motive than to gratify hatred or ill-will by blasting 
the character and reputation of their victims. Such is not the law 
of Louisiana.43 
In doing so, the court rejected the defendant’s constitutional arguments 
based upon its freedom to publish truthful information as “utterly 
unfounded.”44 It affirmed the judgment against the publisher and refused 
a rehearing.45 
Earlier cases have similar sentiments. In 1803, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court found a newspaper liable for publishing information that 
suggested that a clergyman had had a past dalliance with a parishioner.46 
In finding for the clergyman, the court lamented that many misunderstood 
“liberty of the press” to mean that the press could publish what it wanted.47 
Here, the court found specifically that the matter concerning the 
clergyman’s past was “improper for public examination” and ruled 
against the newspaper.48 The basis for the court’s decision was not that 
the information was untruthful and defamatory, but that it was out of 
bounds and essentially unfair. In 1808, Massachusetts’s high court 
similarly suggested that the publication of a critical history of a man’s 
dealings with another was inappropriate and explained that “if the 
publication be true, the tendency of it to inflame the passions, and to excite 
revenge . . . may sometimes be strengthened.”49 
The United States Supreme Court expressed a related sentiment in 1845 
in a case involving a letter critical of a public servant’s past work. There, 
the Court wrote, publications that harm a man’s “sympathetic and social” 
nature could rightly be the subjects of litigation.50 Using that reasoning, 
therefore, even someone who was a candidate for public office would 
arguably have had a cause of action against the publisher of truthful 
                                                     
43. Id. (emphasis added) (author translation). 
44. Id. (author translation). 
45. Id. at 383. 
46. Runkle v. Meyer, 3 Yeates 518 (Pa. 1803). 
47. Id. at 519. 
48. Id.  
49. Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163, 168 (1808). 
50. White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. 266, 285 (1845). 
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information as long as that information was “calculated to make [an 
individual] infamous, or odious, or ridiculous.”51 The publisher of such 
matter, the Court wrote, would properly face liability because the article 
had impaired personal happiness and social order.52 
Therefore, when a Texas court wrote in 1878 that it was a well-
established doctrine that it would be tortious to suggest that another was 
“notoriously of bad or infamous character” even though such information 
were true,53 enough common law history supported such an assessment. 
Courts had suggested as much for at least seventy-five years.54 
Twelve years after the Texas court’s decision, Warren and Brandeis 
expressed similar sentiments in The Right to Privacy.55 The article argued 
for a privacy right that would give most individuals a legal claim against 
an entity that had published their “private affairs” about personal and 
family life,56 an argument that was, of course, broad enough to include 
liability for the publication of information about one’s past life. 
Language in the article that more clearly supports a Right to Be 
Forgotten is found in the authors’ references to European commenters and 
court decisions. For example, when discussing an individual’s privacy 
rights in general, Warren and Brandeis quoted French law, suggesting that 
it supported the notion that “the wholesale investigations into the past of 
[even] prominent public men” is a privacy invasion and that “all the 
details of private life . . . shall not be laid bare for inspection.”57 Warren 
and Brandies concluded that “[s]ome things all men alike are entitled to 
keep from popular curiosity.”58 The authors also highlighted a British case 
in which the court suggests that older letters from a deceased individual 
should be protected “in after life” for privacy reasons.59 
By 1931, then, when a California appeals court heard a case involving 
a former prostitute who had long since changed her ways to live an 
“exemplary, virtuous, honorable, and righteous life,”60 it was clear who 
would win the invasion-of-privacy claim she had brought against the 
filmmaker who had outed her. Had the publisher’s story of the once-
                                                     
51. Suggesting that such information, therefore, would not be in the public interest. Id. at 290–91.  
52. Id. at 291. 
53. Morton v. State, 3 Tex. App. 510, 518 (1878). 
54. See Gajda, supra note 25. 
55. It is not clear why the authors do not rely on these older cases, as noted later in this Part.  
56. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 213.  
57. Id. at 216 n.1 (emphasis added). 
58. Id. at 216. 
59. Id. at 201 n.1. 
60. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931). 
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prostitute stopped with the exploration of the incidents in the woman’s 
past life without more, the court wrote, there would be no possible cause 
of action.61 Instead, the filmmakers “went further, and in the formation of 
the plot used [her] true maiden name . . . in connection with the true 
incidents from her life . . . .”62 Therefore, the court found, the once-
prostitute had a viable cause of action; the publishers had wrongly 
revealed the current identity of one with a past, someone who had 
rehabilitated her life:  
This change having occurred . . . she should have been permitted 
to continue its course without having her reputation and social 
standing destroyed by the publication of the story of her former 
depravity with no other excuse than the expectation of private 
gain by the publishers.63 
The California case involving the former prostitute’s Right to Be 
Forgotten-like right to privacy became a part of William Prosser’s 
Privacy,64 the law review article published in 1960 that collected and 
analyzed prior privacy-relevant case law and one that, like the 1890’s The 
Right to Privacy before it, became a cornerstone of privacy law in the 
United States. In the article, Prosser highlighted the case as one that stood 
for the principle that an individual’s past public life can indeed again 
become private.65 Initially calling the lapse of time’s effect on a privacy 
claim a “difficult question,” Prosser suggested that “[t]he answer may be 
that the existence of a public record is a factor of a good deal of 
importance, which will normally prevent the matter from being private, 
but that under some special circumstances[,] [even that] is not necessarily 
conclusive.”66 
Later in the article, Prosser noted that liability for such publication 
regarding an individual’s embarrassing past was a “troublesome question” 
which had not yet been uniformly resolved.67 Past history is important, he 
wrote, and “[t]here can be no doubt that . . . the revival of past events that 
                                                     
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 93. 
63. Id. See also Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (criminal 
reenactment from year before created valid invasion of privacy claim). 
64. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
65. Id. at 392, 396, 419. 
66. Id. at 396. 
67. Id. at 418. This seems to reflect in part the holding of Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 
(2d Cir. 1940), a case in which the court found that a recluse’s past life as a child prodigy made him 
properly the subject of current interest. 
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once were news[] can properly be a matter of present public interest,”68 
but he also noted that there seemed to be some limitation in U.S. law on 
such exploration and revelation.69 “All that can be said,” Prosser wrote, 
“is that there appear to be situations in which ancient history cannot safely 
be revived.”70 
In 1971, eleven years after Prosser’s assessment of Right to Be 
Forgotten-like privacy interests in the United States, California became 
even more specific with regard to the privacy in one’s criminal past. In 
Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest,71 the state’s highest court held that 
rehabilitated individuals had some right to privacy in their past crimes. In 
the case, Reader’s Digest had published a mention of a carjacking that had 
occurred eleven years before, naming the man who police arrested and 
describing his crime.72 Certain family members and friends, unfamiliar 
with Marvin Briscoe’s criminal past, abandoned him when they learned 
the truth.73 He then sued Reader’s Digest on privacy grounds.74 The court 
sided with Briscoe. “Unless the individual has reattracted the public eye 
to himself in some independent fashion,” the court wrote with regard to 
the balance between the newsworthiness of the underlying information of 
the long-ago crime and the once-criminal’s right to privacy, “the only 
public ‘interest’ that would usually be served is that of curiosity.”75 It 
suggested that the rehabilitation of those with criminal records was more 
important than the republication of a crime that had occurred many years 
before.76 
In 1977, six years after Briscoe was decided, when Prosser was a 
Reporter for the Second Restatement, he and his co-authors included the 
language in the Restatement quoted earlier in this section, suggesting that 
people in the United States have privacy in some “past history that [they] 
                                                     
68. Prosser, supra note 64, at 418. 
69. Id.  
70. Id. at 419 (emphasis added). Prosser may have been influenced by Miller v. NBC, 157 F. Supp. 
240 (D. Del. 1957), as well. In that case, the plaintiff sued after a television program reenacted his 
bank robbery victimization. Id. at 241. The court suggested that liability could well have ensued had 
the program named the plaintiff. Id. at 243. Here, it “did not identify plaintiff in his present setting 
with that incident out of [the] past.” Id. The court noted specifically that its opinion “should not be 
interpreted as sanctioning the unbridled appropriation of an individual’s intimate history merely 
because it has once been exposed to public view.” Id.  
71. 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971). 
72. Id. at 36. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 40. 
76. Id. 
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would rather forget,”77 including the potential for a right to privacy in past 
crimes, and offering the Jean Valjean outing example as a potentially 
viable claim for publication of private facts.78 After all, since at least the 
early 1800s, several courts, including California’s highest court, had 
suggested as much: there was a Right to Be Forgotten-like right to privacy 
in one’s past and that the Right included even information that was once 
decidedly public.79 
II. A MORE MODERN RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
A. The Supreme Court and a Right to Be Forgotten 
It is of some consequence that in 2004, the Supreme Court of California 
effectively reversed its decision in Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest. The 2004 
decision, Gates v. Discovery Communications,80 involved a television 
documentary about a murder for hire that had occurred twelve years 
before. There, the court reviewed United States Supreme Court precedent 
and suggested that a line of Supreme Court cases, including Cox 
Broadcasting v. Cohn81 and Bartnicki v. Vopper,82 “fatally undermined” 
Briscoe’s holding.83 “[T]he [United States Supreme Court] has never 
suggested . . . that the fact the public record of a criminal proceeding may 
have come into existence years previously affects the absolute right of the 
press to report its contents,” the court wrote.84 The California court ruled 
in favor of the television program producers and against the man whose 
criminal past had been broadcast as a part of the program.85 
                                                     
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
78. Id. at cmt. k, illus. 26. 
79. See also Bernstein v. NBC, 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955). There, the court rejected a 
plaintiff’s claim for invasion of privacy based upon a televised depiction of his past crimes. Id. at 819. 
In doing so, however, the court noted that the once-criminal had not been named. Id. at 819–20. After 
quoting from several successful invasion-of-privacy cases in which the plaintiffs had won, the court 
suggested that those plaintiffs had been identified by name. Id. at 828–29. It wrote: 
This court agrees that we are not so uncivilized that the law permits, in the name of public 
interest, the unlimited and unwarranted revival by publication of a rehabilitated wrongdoer’s past 
mistakes in a manner as to identify him in his private setting with the old crime and hold him up 
to public scorn.  
Id. at 828. 
80. 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004). 
81. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
82. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
83. Gates, 101 P.3d at 559. 
84. Id. at 560. 
85. Id. at 563. 
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A review of those landmark U.S. Supreme Court opinions—Cox 
Broadcasting and Bartnicki—and the similarly archetypally pro-media 
Florida Star v. B.J.F.,86 however, suggests that there is some flexibility 
among the Justices with regard to a Right to Be Forgotten. In other words, 
the California Supreme Court’s language in Gates describing Supreme 
Court precedent in the negative—that the Court had never suggested that 
the press has no right to publish one’s criminal past—may have been the 
strongest synthesis of Supreme Court cases it could muster. The Supreme 
Court has also never held explicitly that no Right to Be Forgotten exists. 
1. Cox Broadcasting and Its Progeny 
While many read Supreme Court cases that address the clash between 
privacy rights and press rights as decidedly favoring the press, the 
language within them is not so simple. Consider Cox Broadcasting v. 
Cohn,87 for example. That case concerned a 17-year-old rape victim who 
had been murdered.88 The defendant in the case was a television station 
that had reported her identity after learning of it through indictment papers 
made available in court.89 A Georgia statute at the time made the 
identification of a rape victim a misdemeanor.90 The journalist-defendants 
argued that the statute was unconstitutional; they maintained that news 
media should never be liable civilly or criminally for publishing accurate 
information, even when that information is damaging to “individual 
sensibilities.”91 But the Court refused to grant media such a broad waiver. 
Instead, it held only that when publication is based upon “judicial records 
which are maintained in connection with a public prosecution and which 
themselves are open to public inspection,”92 there would usually be no 
liability. 
“[A]scertaining and publishing the contents of public records are 
simply not within the reach” of a tort action for invasion of privacy based 
upon publication of private facts, the Court wrote.93 Moreover, it noted, 
“[p]ublic records by their very nature are of interest to those concerned 
                                                     
86. 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
87. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
88. Id. at 471. 
89. Id. at 472–73. 
90. Id. at 471–72. 
91. Id. at 489. 
92. Id. at 491. Throughout, the Court very much focuses on the public nature of the record. See id. 
at 494. 
93. Id. at 494–95. 
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with the administration of government, and a public benefit is performed 
by the reporting of the true contents of the records by the media,”94 
suggesting that the Justices would not want to punish or prevent the 
publication of information made generally available to the media by the 
government itself.95 
The ultimate holding in Cox Broadcasting is therefore quite limited: 
“the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not allow exposing the press 
to liability for truthfully publishing information released to the public in 
official court records,”96 the Court wrote, and “[o]nce true information is 
disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press 
cannot be sanctioned for publishing it.”97 The Court also maintained that 
its decision was a narrow one, pointedly refusing to extend the reach of 
Cox Broadcasting beyond the facts in front of it.98 In the end, therefore, 
the case held only that the publication of truthful information recently 
released to the public by the government through official public records 
cannot be sanctioned.99 
Moreover, and of special significance here, language in Cox 
Broadcasting at the same time embraces privacy. Consider the following 
passage in light of the Court’s ultimate conclusion that media cannot be 
punished for publishing information made available to the public by the 
government. Consider too its pointed nod to the 1890 Warren and 
Brandeis article: 
[T]here is a zone of privacy surrounding every individual, a zone 
within which the State may protect him from intrusion by the 
press, with all its attendant publicity. Indeed, the central thesis of 
the root article by Warren and Brandeis was that the press was 
overstepping its prerogatives by publishing essentially private 
information and that there should be a remedy for the alleged 
abuses.100 
And this: 
                                                     
94. Id. at 495. 
95. Id. at 496. 
96. Id.  
97. Id.  
98. Id. at 491. The Court wrote that rather than addressing broader questions, it was “appropriate 
to focus on the narrower interface between press and privacy that this case presents, namely, whether 
the State may impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained 
from public records.” Id. 
99. See id. at 496 n.26, 497 n.27. 
100. Id. at 487 (citation omitted) (noting too that “[m]ore compellingly, the century has experienced 
a strong tide running in favor of the so-called right of privacy”). 
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In this sphere of collision between claims of privacy and those of 
the free press, the interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the 
traditions and significant concerns of our society.101 
In other words, it seems that Cox Broadcasting itself recognizes that 
sometimes the press will overstep its bounds by reporting truthful but 
private information and that in those cases, media liability can be 
appropriate and presumably constitutional—and, finally, that well-rooted 
“tradition” dictates as much. 
A decade later in Florida Star v. B.J.F.,102 the Court was similarly non-
committal with regard to overarching press protections. In that case, a rape 
victim sued the Florida Star newspaper after it published her name.103 
Again, a statute was in place that punished the publication of such a 
victim’s identity.104 And again the Court refused to hold media liable 
under the circumstances, those in which the newspaper had obtained the 
victim’s name from an official report placed in the open-access 
pressroom.105 
Noting specifically once again that its holding was “limited,”106 the 
Justices wrote that “only that where a newspaper publishes truthful 
information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be 
imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the 
highest order”107 and that under the circumstances of the case—one in 
which the government itself had released the victim’s name to the media 
in a publicly accessible location despite its power not to108—liability 
against the newspaper was inappropriate.109 
Notably, the Court again specifically refused to grant the media’s 
request for broader protections for the publication of all truthful 
                                                     
101. Id. at 491. 
102. 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
103. Id. at 526. 
104. Id.  
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 540. 
107. Id. at 541. For an explanation of narrow tailoring, see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
395 (1992). In R.A.V., a case involving a statute that prohibited cross burning, the Court focused on 
the statute’s purpose of allowing those who have been discriminated against to live in peace and 
suggested that the First Amendment did not allow “special hostility” toward even reprehensible 
particular speech. Id. at 396. “The ‘danger of censorship’ presented by a facially content-based 
statute,” the Court wrote in that case, “requires that that weapon be employed only where it is 
‘necessary to serve the asserted compelling interest.’” Id. at 395. 
108. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535. 
109. Id. at 541. 
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information,110 including the Court’s surprising specific rejection of 
protection for media in cases with similar facts.111 In doing so, the Court 
once again reinforced the importance of an individual’s privacy rights: 
We do not hold that truthful publication is automatically 
constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal 
privacy within which the State may protect the individual from 
intrusion by the press, or even that a State may never punish 
publication of the name of a victim of a sexual offense.112 
Indeed, the Justices wrote unequivocally that “[w]e . . . do not rule out 
the possibility that, in a proper case, imposing civil sanctions for 
publication of the name of a rape victim might be so overwhelmingly 
necessary to advance [government] interests” that liability would be 
constitutional.113 Here, however, the Court was concerned in some part 
with the negligence per se standard in the statute—a standard that the 
Justices suggested would cause liability to flow directly from publication 
no matter the important factual nuances at issue, including whether the 
victim’s identity was currently known by many in the community.114 The 
Court was also troubled that the statute also punished only publication by 
“mass communication” and not individual gossip, suggesting that the 
consequences of the latter may be even more devastating.115 
In other words, Florida Star suggests that there could well be times in 
which liability even for the publication of the name of a rape victim would 
be appropriate and constitutional.116 The decision, described in the Court’s 
own language, does not stand for the principle that all publication of 
truthful information is protected. 
Finally, in Bartnicki v. Vopper,117 a 2001 case pitting privacy interests 
against press interests, the Court again found in favor of media but also 
again refused to grant the press the freedom to publish any truthful 
information that had been made available to it.118 In Bartnicki, the radio 
                                                     
110. Id. at 532. 
111. Id. at 541. 
112. Id.  
113. Id. at 537. 
114. Id. at 539.  
115. Id. at 540. 
116. I have argued this in past law review and news media articles. See also Michael J. Kelly & 
David Satola, The Right to Be Forgotten, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 33 (discussing Cox Broadcasting 
and B.J.F. v. Florida Star and noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has not broadly decided either to 
always protect privacy or always protect the First Amendment without restriction in the case of 
publicizing the identity of a victim of sexual assault”). 
117. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
118. Id. at 534. 
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station defendant had played on air a surreptitiously recorded telephone 
conversation it had received in the mail anonymously.119 A voice on the 
tape suggested that violence would be in order to help influence a 
contentious teachers’ union negotiation.120 Based in part upon those facts, 
the Supreme Court consciously framed the issue in front of it very 
narrowly: “[w]here the punished publisher of [newsworthy] information 
has obtained the information in question in a manner lawful in itself but 
from a source who has obtained it unlawfully, may the government punish 
the ensuing publication of that information based on the defect in a 
chain?”121 
In Bartnicki, the answer was no: there would be no liability on the part 
of this particular radio station publisher.122 First, the information itself, the 
Court decided, was newsworthy.123 In deciding as much, however, the 
Justices suggested that not all truthful information would be of similar 
designation, noting that an individual’s privacy interests could well justify 
punishment for publication of “domestic gossip or other information of 
purely private concern.”124 The case at bar, in contrast, involved the 
publication of information that proved that someone had suggested 
violence would be appropriate in teachers’ union negotiations—a matter 
of “unquestionabl[e]”125 “public importance”126 in which public interest 
concerns clearly weighed more strongly in the balance than privacy 
interests.127 
Second, the Court noted that the radio station’s hands were clean. It 
was, instead, “a stranger’s illegal conduct”128 in recording a private cell 
phone conversation that had created the tape. The station, in contrast, 
merely published something newsworthy it had received anonymously.129 
Moreover, in rejecting liability for the radio station, the Justices noted 
that they had “repeated[ly] refus[ed]” a broader holding that would allow 
the press the right to publish anything truthful that it wished.130 The 
                                                     
119. Id. at 517–18. 
120. Id. at 518–19. 
121. Id. at 528. 
122. Id. at 534. 
123. Id. at 533. 
124. Id.  
125. Id. at 535. 
126. Id. at 534. 
127. Id. at 532. 
128. Id. at 535. 
129. Id. at 519. 
130. Id. at 529. 
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majority quoted language from Florida Star to explain that such repeated 
refusals and narrow holdings in this line of cases were necessary because 
of the “sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes 
between the First Amendment and privacy rights.”131 
In fact, the Court raised what it called a “still-open question,” one that 
suggested the possibility for media liability in cases in which media’s 
hands were not so clean: “whether, in cases where information has been 
acquired unlawfully by a newspaper . . . government may ever punish not 
only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well.”132 
Ultimately, the Court decided only that “a stranger’s illegal conduct does 
not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a 
matter of public concern.”133 
Justice Breyer, in concurrence, put it even more strongly with regard to 
the radio station’s decision to air the tape of the callers’ conversation: 
“[h]ere, the speakers’ legitimate privacy expectations [were] unusually 
low, and the public interest in defeating those expectations [was] 
unusually high . . . . [Therefore,] the statutes’ enforcement would 
disproportionately harm media freedom.”134 
He suggested also that “the Constitution permits legislatures to respond 
flexibly to the challenges future technology may pose to the individual’s 
interest in basic personal privacy.”135 In other words, in Justice Breyer’s 
assessment, too, media’s choice to publish private facts about an 
individual would not always win constitutionally. 
It is true, then, as the Gates court noted, that “the high court has never 
suggested . . . that the fact the public record of a criminal proceeding may 
have come into existence years previously affects the absolute right of the 
press to report its contents.”136 Consider the corollary, however, as seen 
in Cox Broadcasting, Florida Star, and Bartnicki. The high court has also 
never expressly suggested that publishers do in fact always have the right 
to reveal truthful information, including information about one’s past, no 
matter how far back it goes. In fact, as the 2004 California decision in 
Gates notes, the United States Supreme Court “did not expressly overrule 
Briscoe” in Cox Broadcasting, even though the Court mentioned the 
                                                     
131. Id.  
132. Id. at 528 (internal quotation marks omitted). A question that a federal appeals court would 
later answer in the affirmative, in a case explored in a later Part. See infra section II.D. 
133. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535. 
134. Id. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
135. Id. at 541. 
136. Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552, 560 (Cal. 2004). 
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Briscoe case in its decision and effectively could have.137 In fact, the Court 
cites Briscoe only once, and in a way that aligns well at least in part with 
Cox Broadcasting’s own holding: writing that Briscoe stands for the 
proposition that “the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment do not 
require total abrogation of the right to privacy.”138 
Moreover, in Cox Broadcasting, the Court specifically noted that a case 
involving other types of less accessible government records, such as 
juvenile criminal records, could well raise different constitutional 
questions. “We mean to imply nothing about any constitutional questions 
which might arise from a state policy not allowing access by the public 
and press to various kinds of official records,” the Court wrote, “such as 
records of juvenile-court proceedings.”139 
If it is a still open question, then, as the Court suggested, whether courts 
can punish media for publishing truthful information acquired illegally, 
then the question standing alone suggests that some information may have 
greater privacy significance, and that such information could include 
government records kept out of public circulation. Juvenile criminal 
records, it seems, deserved at least special mention with regard to privacy 
interests, key here because they contain truthful information about the past 
and are traditionally kept private.140 
Of additional note, California’s high court itself limited its holding in 
Gates, the opinion that overruled Briscoe, thereby suggesting that there is 
still at least some potential privacy in one’s past in California. The court 
wrote only that, in its estimation, privacy lawsuits could neither be based 
upon “facts obtained from public official court records”141 nor upon 
information “from public official records of a criminal proceeding.”142 
The use of the decidedly limiting words “public” and “criminal” here is 
of some note. Even Gates, therefore, leaves open the question of whether 
one has a Right to Be Forgotten-like right of privacy in one’s older, non-
public—perhaps juvenile or expunged—criminal records. It also leaves 
open the question of whether non-public, civil records could be the basis 
for a claim. Finally, it does not address whether one might have a similar 
                                                     
137. Id. at 560 n.5. 
138. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 474 (1975).  
139. Id. at 496 n.26.  
140. When the United States Supreme Court wrote in a different context in Snyder v. Phelps that 
matters of public concern meant information that is the “subject of legitimate news interest . . . and of 
value and concern to the public,” its definitional language was limited in line with its prior holdings: 
“legitimate” news that is of “value” to the public and that which raises some matter of public 
“concern.” 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011). In doing so, it again rejected a sweeping definition that would 
include all truthful matters that publishers themselves had decided were of interest to the public. 
141. Gates, 101 P.3d at 560 (emphasis added). 
142. Id. at 562 (emphasis added). 
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right in historic embarrassing or deeply private information about one’s 
life not found in any official government record at all. 
By the time of the Gates decision in 2004, in fact, the United States 
Supreme Court had also effectively recognized the importance of similar 
types of privacy in cases outside the context of publication. Beyond Cox 
Broadcasting, Florida Star, and Bartnicki, there is language from the 
Supreme Court that quite specifically recognizes the value of a right to 
privacy in one’s past. 
2. The Freedom of Information Act Cases 
Although similar sentiments appear elsewhere in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, it is in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)143 cases that 
the Court has used its strongest language that supports at least in part a 
Right to Be Forgotten.144 Two key decisions, United States Department of 
Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,145 decided in 
1989, and National Archives v. Favish,146 decided in 2004, concern access 
to government documents, though not later publication. Both decide that 
it would be painful for some to revisit the past, and hold that protection 
against such harm is an important part of privacy considerations in the 
United States. In both, moreover, worries about the present impact of 
information about a past crime is at some issue. 
In Reporters Committee, journalists had asked for so-called “rap 
sheets” of four organized crime suspects who allegedly had had dealings 
with at least one member of Congress.147 The government refused to 
release the rap sheets—reports containing the individuals’ separate 
criminal histories—and the Justices agreed that the information should not 
be released.148 
The Court quoted with approval the trial court’s assertion that there was 
no need to “balanc[e] [the] privacy interest against the public interest in 
                                                     
143. FOIA is the federal statute that gives public access to government documents and other 
information. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). It does, however, contain several exemptions that keep multiple 
documents out of public hands. One of special note here is the provision that exempts “personnel and 
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy” from disclosure. Id. § 552(b)(6). 
144. See, e.g., Steven C. Bennett, The “Right to Be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and US 
Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 171 (2012) (discussing cases regarding public records 
and the Freedom of Information Act and suggesting that “[o]utside the context of newsworthy stories, 
U.S. courts have been less inclined to insist on unrestrained access to information”). 
145. 489 U.S. 749 (1989). 
146. 541 U.S. 157 (2004). 
147. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 757–58. 
148. Justices Blackmun and Brennan concurred in the judgment. 
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disclosure,” as “the invasion of privacy was ‘clearly unwarranted.’”149 “It 
seems highly unlikely that information about offenses which may have 
occurred 30 or 40 years ago . . . would have any relevance or public 
interest,” the Court noted, again quoting the trial court.150 
The Supreme Court’s own language was similarly strong. It rejected 
the journalists’ argument that crimes detailed in a rap sheet could not be 
private because they had once been public, calling such a notion a 
“cramped notion of personal privacy.”151 The Justices then cited Warren 
and Brandeis’s 1890 article The Right to Privacy for the proposition that 
“the passage of time” can in fact render something that was once public, 
private again.152 They also suggested that the Freedom of Information 
Act’s privacy provisions, including the provisions that protect certain 
information from revelation, reflected Congress’s understanding that 
“significant privacy interests” were at stake in information that would 
include the compilation of public criminal records.153 
Important here, the Justices in Reporters Committee also rejected the 
proposition that there would be some news value or proper public interest 
in an individual’s criminal past, noting instead that “rap sheets reveal only 
the dry, chronological, personal history of individuals who have had 
brushes with the law, and tell us nothing about matters . . . that are 
properly the subject of public concern.”154 Such protection for one’s 
criminal history is especially necessary in the computer age, the Court 
suggested, because the substantial privacy interests in a rap sheet become 
even more critical when technology “can accumulate and store 
information that would otherwise have surely been forgotten long 
before.”155 
In what Justice Blackmun in his concurrence called a “bright line”156 
approach by the Court in Reporters Committee, then, the Justices 
protected rap sheets quite categorically. After noting that “[t]he privacy 
interest in maintaining the practical obscurity of rap-sheet information 
will always be high,” with privacy at its apex and public interest at its 
lowest when the subject is a “private citizen,” the Court wrote:157 
                                                     
149. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 758. 
150. Id. at 758 n.11 (emphasis added). 
151. Id. at 763. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 766. 
154. Id. at 766 n.18 (emphasis added). 
155. Id. at 771. 
156. Id. at 780. 
157. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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Accordingly, we hold as a categorical matter that a third party’s 
request for law enforcement records or information about a 
private citizen can reasonably be expected to invade that citizen’s 
privacy, and that when the request seeks no “official information” 
about a Government agency, but merely [seeks] records that the 
Government happens to be storing, the invasion of privacy is 
“unwarranted.”158 
Two years later, in Favish, a unanimous decision that refused a FOIA 
request for death scene records and one in which the Court recognized a 
family’s privacy in death photographs, the Justices again suggested that 
historic facts could be protected because of present privacy concerns. In 
doing so, they quoted with approval an 1895 decision that respected the 
“well-established cultural tradition acknowledging a family’s control over 
the body and death images of the deceased,” one that, in the Justices’ 
opinion, reflected the common law more generally:159 
It is the right of privacy of the living which it is sought to enforce 
here. That right may in some cases be itself violated by 
improperly interfering with the character or memory of a 
deceased relative, but it is the right of the living, and not that of 
the dead, which is recognized. A privilege may be given the 
surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, 
but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their 
feelings, and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the 
character and memory of the deceased.160 
Here too is the suggestion that a decedent’s survivors have a privacy-
based right to effectively curate the past by suppressing some painful 
elements to preserve others. “Family members,” the Court wrote, “have a 
personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to 
unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief, 
tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased 
person who was once their own.”161 
And here too the Court specifically mentioned its worries that 
technology could extend the longevity of information, making the past 
more accessible in the present and impacting privacy by doing so. 162 
Family members, the Court explained, “seek to be shielded . . . to secure 
                                                     
158. Id.  
159. National Archives v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2003). 
160. Id. at 168–69 (emphasis added) (citing Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. 1895)). 
161. Id. at 168. 
162. Id. at 167. 
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their own refuge from a sensation-seeking culture for their own peace of 
mind and tranquility.”163 
Moreover, the Court in dicta seemingly extended the right to privacy 
to situations involving the publication of such images, citing with 
approval a case in which a mother had had a successful claim for privacy 
in the publication of a photograph of her dead child164 and an example 
from the Restatement that validates a publication-of-private-facts cause of 
action when a newspaper publishes a photograph of a dead infant.165 
There are similar sentiments in Department of the Air Force v. Rose,166 
a case in which the Court refused to automatically release older 
information identifying once-cadets’ ethics and honor code violations 
even though the information had years before been released more publicly 
at the Air Force Academy.167 The Court again worried about the damage 
this dated information could cause. “[T]he risk to the privacy interests of 
a former cadet, particularly one who has remained in the military,” the 
Court wrote, “cannot be rejected as trivial.”168 Here, the Court noted 
specifically, those who once had the knowledge could well have 
“forgotten” about the cadet’s disciplinary encounter with school 
administrators.169 Therefore, it decided, information from the past could 
in some cases be protected on privacy grounds.170 
3. Other Right to Be Forgotten-Relevant Supreme Court Cases 
There are additional examples of Right to Be Forgotten sensibilities at 
the Court: outcomes and language in cases involving once-public figures 
turned private individuals, involving school disciplinary records of young 
                                                     
163. Id. at 166. 
164. Id. at 169 (citing Bazemore v. Savannah Gen. Hosp., 155 S.E. 194 (Ga. 1930)).  
165. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977)).  
166. 425 U.S. 352 (1976); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. a, illus. 7 
(AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“A gives birth to a child with two heads, which immediately dies. A reporter 
from B Newspaper asks A’s permission to photograph the body of the child, which is refused. The 
reporter then bribes hospital attendants to permit him, against A’s orders, to take the photograph, 
which is published in B Newspaper with an account of the facts, naming A. B has invaded A’s 
privacy.”). 
167. Id. at 381. 
168. Rose, 425 U.S. at 379. 
169. Id. at 380–81 (“Despite the summaries’ distribution within the Academy, many of this group 
with earlier access to summaries may never have identified a particular cadet, or may have wholly 
forgotten his encounter with Academy discipline.”). 
170. In the end the Court upheld the appropriateness of an in camera review of the files that 
balanced public interest against those privacy interests. Id. at 381. 
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people, and involving the rights of the press to publish historically correct 
but privacy-invading information. 
In Time v. Firestone,171 decided the same year as Rose, the Court held 
that a woman who had once been married to the “scion” of a very public 
family—namely, the Firestones of tire fame—could presently be 
considered a private person despite very strong media interest in her in the 
past.172 The underlying defamation case decided by the Court, one 
springing from the publication of incorrect sordid details of Mary Alice 
Firestone’s divorce after a short marriage, held that she was not a public 
figure and that her divorce was not a public controversy.173 She “did not 
assume any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society,” the 
Court wrote, and “did not thrust herself to the forefront of any particular 
public controversy in order to influence the resolution of issues involved 
in it.”174 
The holding arguably shares sensibilities with a Right to Be Forgotten 
in some sense. Mary Alice Firestone had been the subject of strong 
newspaper coverage from the time of her wedding in 1961, the pinnacle 
of interest in her as an individual, to the time of her filing for divorce in 
1964, a time of more waning public interest.175 Her wedding to Russell 
Firestone was covered by The New York Times176 and dozens of large and 
small newspapers across the United States.177 A significant number of 
those newspapers had included photographs of the couple, a sign of the 
story’s newsworthiness and of her own public prominence through 
marriage.178 The reported theft of her $250,000 wedding ring some 
months later again thrust her into the news as an individual.179 Still later, 
more local coverage focused on a car crash in which she was injured180 
and the hearing in which she was adjudicated incompetent to care for her 
                                                     
171. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
172. Id. at 457. 
173. Id. at 454. 
174. Id. at 453. 
175. Id. at 454. 
176. Russell Firestone Jr. Weds Mary Sullivan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1961, at L33. 
177. This information is the result of searches on Newspapers.com, ProQuest Newspapers, and 
America’s Historical Imprints. Because the databases are incomplete, there was likely significant 
additional coverage in newspapers that are not included in these databases. 
178. See, e.g., Rubber Heir Weds, IND. GAZETTE, Aug. 3, 1961, at 12. The photograph’s cutline 
indicates that it was sent out over the Associated Press wire, a further indication of the newsworthiness 
of the story. 
179. See, e.g., Hunt Gang in Theft of $250,000 Diamond, CHI. TRIB., July 3, 1963, at 39. 
180. Mrs. Firestone’s Condition Poor, PALM BEACH POST, Feb. 8, 1964, at 2. 
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personal interests because of alleged mental health problems.181 This 
coverage indicates some continuing media interest in her in the years 
between her marriage and the time in which she filed for divorce. 
Yet, the Court in Time v. Firestone decided that Firestone’s high-
profile divorce did not cause her to suddenly become a public figure 
again.182 In other words, despite significant earlier media interest in her as 
an individual during her marriage, by the time of the actual divorce 
proceedings in 1967, she was again a private figure in the eyes of the 
Court. Arguably, therefore, there was some privacy right to her past even 
though she was once well known publicly; private figures have greater 
privacy rights than do public figures and she had seemingly become 
private again given the passage of time. 
Consider too Doe v. McMillan,183 a case involving a report drafted by 
Congress in the 1970s that contained disparaging personal information 
about public school students, including individual students’ absences, test 
results, and disciplinary problems.184 Justice White’s lead opinion echoed 
the plaintiffs’ concerns about the impact the revelation of such 
information would have on their future careers.185 But it was Justice 
Douglas’s concurrence that more firmly noted the distinct, later privacy 
interests in these childhood records, warning of the “potentially 
devastating effects” to the individuals should such information about the 
past be revealed later in life: 
[M]isdeeds or indiscretions may be devastating to a person in later 
years when he has outgrown youthful indiscretions and is trying 
to launch a professional career or move into a position where 
steadfastness is required.186 
Indeed, the Court specifically noted that the appellate court had refused 
to enjoin the publication of such privacy-invading information contained 
in the congressional report only because “no republication or further 
distribution of the report was contemplated,”187 suggesting that it would 
                                                     
181. Appointed as Guardian, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 18, 1964, at 2 (photograph and cutline). 
182. Time v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976). 
183. 412 U.S. 306 (1972). 
184. Id. at 308. 
185. Id. at 309. 
186. Id. at 329 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
187. Id. at 310 n.5 (majority opinion); see also United States v. Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. 418 (1983). 
In Sells Engineering, the Court suggests that even though information has been revealed publicly, 
privacy arguments are not moot and privacy should be protected. “We cannot restore the secrecy that 
has already been lost,” the Court wrote, “but we can grant partial relief by preventing further 
disclosure.” Id. at 423 n.6 (quoting the appeals court decision, 642 F.2d 1184, 1187–88 (9th Cir. 
1981)). 
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have otherwise enjoined the publication. Here, too, then, the Court 
embraced the right to privacy in past information in at least some sense. 
It is true that in 1971, the Court decided in a defamation-related case 
that information concerning the alleged criminal past—“no matter how 
remote in time or place”—of a candidate for public office “can never be 
irrelevant” to a candidate’s fitness for office.188 A candidate who runs on 
family values or a sterling reputation, the Court suggested, “cannot 
convincingly cry ‘Foul!’ when . . . an industrious reporter attempts to 
demonstrate the contrary.”189 But even in such a case involving a 
politician, the Court suggested, line-drawing is difficult and the question 
whether there might be some information that would be off limits was an 
open one.190 
Even when the Court protected the press after publication of 
information regarding juvenile offenders in Oklahoma Publishing v. 
District Court of Oklahoma191 and Smith v. Daily Mail,192 its holdings 
were purposefully limited. In the former, members of the press had 
learned the identity of a juvenile criminal defendant because they had been 
allowed into the courtroom by the judge.193 Given that the state itself had 
given the media the information without restriction, the later publication 
would be protected by the First Amendment.194 In Daily Mail, media had 
learned similar information from a police radio broadcast and from 
eyewitness interviews, and the Court held similarly that the newspaper 
had the right to publish on those grounds.195 “[T]here is no issue of 
privacy” or “unlawful press access to confidential judicial proceedings” 
on the facts, the Court wrote, noting again specifically that it holding was 
“narrow.”196 
By 2001, then, when the Court decided Bartnicki in a way that once 
again left open the possibility for a valid invasion-of-privacy claim based 
upon the publication of truthful information that was sufficiently private 
and not newsworthy, there was some basis on which to conclude that that 
piece of “private” information could in fact include something that had 
happened in one’s past—and that that information could have once been 
                                                     
188. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971). 
189. Id. at 274. 
190. Id. at 275. 
191. 430 U.S. 308 (1977). 
192. 443 U.S. 97 (1979). 
193. Oklahoma Publ’g, 430 U.S. at 309. 
194. Id. at 312. 
195. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 105. 
196. Id.  
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known publicly at least in some sense.197 Through dicta and otherwise, 
language from the Court is strong enough and the threads are seemingly 
pervasive enough to suggest some foundation for a Right to Be Forgotten 
even at the nation’s highest court. 
B. Right to Be Forgotten-Like Sentiments in Lower Courts 
As indicated at the start of this Article, modern lower courts have also 
held or have at least suggested that individuals have some privacy 
interests in once-public matters that have faded from the spotlight. Recall 
the Pennsylvania man with the court-described non-newsworthy criminal 
record and the Justice Department official who earlier had been under 
some sort of investigation, both individuals whose pasts were protected 
on privacy grounds in Right to Be Forgotten-relevant decisions. 
Consider as another example a well-known privacy case from 1983 that 
very nearly precisely describes the Right.198 There, Toni Diaz, the female 
president of a California community college’s student body, sued the 
Oakland Tribune for revealing that she had had gender affirming surgery 
and that her birth certificate had identified her as a male.199 The California 
appeals court in Diaz v. Oakland Tribune200 reversed the judgment in 
favor of Diaz because of faulty jury instructions.201 In doing so, however, 
the court decidedly favored the plaintiff and, in effect, a Right to Be 
Forgotten. 
First, the court decided that Diaz’s birth certificate identifying her as a 
male thirty-six years before, and her arrest record approximately eight 
years before in which police identified her as a man, did not make her on-
paper once-male gender a public fact.202 Instead, the court found that her 
state-imposed identity as a male could remain private because, in part, she 
had kept it a secret ever since her gender affirming surgery several years 
                                                     
197. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
198. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 139 Cal. App. 3d 118 (1983). Admittedly, the appellate court 
decided Diaz before the California Supreme Court’s holding in Gates v. Discovery Communications, 
101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004), a case discussed in section II.A, but the facts are only marginally parallel, 
and the Gates court does not mention the Diaz case in its decision at all.  
199. Diaz, 139 Cal. App. at 124. 
200. 139 Cal. App. 3d 118 (1983). 
201. Id. at 131. 
202. Id. at 132. 
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before,203 even though some of her life had been spent as a male at least 
in some sense.204 
Second, the court held that a jury could indeed find that her gender 
affirming surgery—the fact that she had been identified as a male who 
then became a female in body when she was thirty-three years old—was 
not newsworthy.205 “Defendants enjoy the right to publish information in 
which the public has a legitimate interest,” the Diaz court wrote.206 Here, 
even though Diaz was a college leader, her gender reassignment surgery 
did not reflect anything about “her honesty or judgment,”207 the court 
noted, suggesting that only that sort of information regarding a student 
body president would be newsworthy.208 
Finally, the court decided that the $775,000 verdict handed down by 
the jury against the newspaper (approximately $2,320,000 in today’s 
dollars209) was not excessive.210 “The evidence of Diaz’s emotional 
distress and suffering” and her “emotional trauma,” the court wrote, “was 
uncontradicted.” It found that such a damages award would be appropriate 
under those circumstances,211 even though the defense had argued in 
response to the verdict that Diaz had spent only $800 on related medical 
care.212 
In its decision, the court distinguished Cox Broadcasting, finding it of 
“little guidance.”213 “Importantly,” the court wrote, Cox Broadcasting 
“expressly refused to address the broader question of whether the truthful 
publication of facts obtained from public records can ever be subjected to 
civil or criminal liability.”214 Here, even though the information used by 
the newspaper to out Toni Diaz was contained within a public birth 
certificate and a public arrest record, the court found that the revelation of 
                                                     
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 123. Diaz testified that she always knew that she was female, however, even in early 
childhood. 
205. Id. at 134. 
206. Id. at 127 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The court cited two cases, including 
Briscoe, and the Restatement of Torts as supporting that conclusion. 
207. Id. at 134. 
208. Id.  
209. US INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/. 
210. Diaz, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 137. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 131. 
214. Id. (emphasis added). 
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such long-ago facts could indeed be the “ever” moment to which the 
Supreme Court referred. 
Put another way, in some sense, Antonio Diaz, born 36 years before, 
had been given the Right to be Forgotten by the court. She had become 
Toni Diaz, and she had been given the right to sue the entity that had 
revealed a deeply personal secret from the past. 
Consider also Haynes v. Knopf, Inc.,215 a case decided ten years after 
Diaz.216 There, the Seventh Circuit suggested that memoirs about the past 
containing information that a plaintiff “would rather forget”217 could spark 
a successful publication-of-private-facts lawsuit; some historically 
accurate but embarrassing information would be too deeply private, 
painful, and shocking if revealed in another’s memoir, including 
“titillating glimpe[s] of tabooed activities,”218 “intimate physical 
details,”219 “intimate medical procedure[s]”220 and graphic information 
about another’s sex life.221 
While fact patterns in additional cases vary, perhaps most striking and 
surprising is Right to Be Forgotten-like sensibilities found in cases 
involving the images captured by authorities when individuals are 
arrested. In these freedom-of-information cases, an individual’s mugshot, 
routinely published by some news outlets in 2018, is protected on privacy 
grounds because of the potential for later harm. These courts suggest, as 
did the Diaz court, that there is some privacy worthy of protection even in 
criminal records because of the potential for abuse by those who may 
reveal it in the future.222 
Consider the 1999 decision by a federal district court in Louisiana 
withholding a public figure’s arrest photograph.223 “[M]ug shots generally 
disclose unflattering facial expressions,” the court suggested, and 
“preserve[] in [their] unique and visually powerful way, the subject’s 
                                                     
215. 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993). 
216. Id.  
217. Id. at 1233. 
218. Id.  
219. Id. at 1234. 
220. Id. at 1232. 
221. See id. at 1232. 
222. See Sarah E. Lageson, Crime Data, the Internet, and Free Speech: An Evolving Legal 
Consciousness, 51 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 8, 9 (2017) (examining the legality of such databases and 
online repositories of criminal information and arguing that “the unfettered public distribution of 
criminal justice data reinforces structural inequalities already present in criminal justice institutions, 
reifying relationships of power and patterns of punishment—of which understanding of law plays a 
key role”). 
223. Times Picayune Publ’g v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 37 F. Supp. 2d 472 (E.D. La. 1999). 
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brush with the law for posterity.”224 Just because such a photograph may 
be in government files, and was at one time routinely released by 
government officials, the court reasoned, does not mean that the 
individual loses privacy interests in it.225 
Moreover, and decidedly relevant here, the court found that a public 
figure’s mug shot—the booking photograph at issue was that of the owner 
of the San Francisco 49ers who had plead guilty to limited involvement 
in a government corruption case—may be even more deserving of 
protection because of the potential for later misuse by rivals in business. 
Each new publication in the future, the court worried, would cause his 
renewed embarrassment or discomfort about his past indiscretions.226 
That same year, the Eleventh Circuit wrote quite broadly in a related 
decision that “individuals have a substantial privacy interest in their 
criminal histories.”227 
Those cases are not outliers. In 2012, the Tenth Circuit held that 
criminal detainees’ mug shots should be protected because of the potential 
for future revelations.228 There, the court repeated its worries about the 
future use of past images: “a mug shot’s stigmatizing effect can last well 
beyond the actual criminal proceedings,” it wrote.229 It then upheld the 
trial court’s decision that suggested that “[c]ommon sense dictates that 
individuals desire to control dissemination of any visual depictions of 
themselves and consider such visual depictions ‘personal matters.’”230 
In that 2012 decision, the Tenth Circuit noted that only one federal 
appellate circuit—the Sixth—had concluded the opposite: that no privacy 
rights exist in mug shots because the public interest in criminal matters 
outweighed the individual’s privacy.231 In late 2015, Sixth Circuit judges, 
recognizing a groundswell, however, voted to hear en banc a case in which 
U.S. marshals had refused a media request for the booking photographs 
of four Michigan police officers.232 “Individuals do not forfeit their 
interest in maintaining control over information that has been made public 
in some form,” the Sixth Circuit panel had written earlier in suggesting 
                                                     
224. Id. at 477 (emphasis added). 
225. Id.  
226. Id. at 479. 
227. O’Kane v. U.S. Customs Serv., 169 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999). 
228. World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825 (10th Cir. 2012). 
229. Id. at 828 (quoting Times Picayune Publ’g, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 477 (emphasis added)). 
230. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32594, at *40 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2011) (emphasis added). 
231. Id. at 828 (citing Detroit Free Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
232. Detroit Free Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 14-1670, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 20224 (6th 
Cir. Nov. 20, 2015). 
10 - Gajda.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2018 11:16 AM 
232 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:201 
 
that the court’s nearly two decades-old decision deserved en banc 
review.233 
Once again, the court’s worries had special relevance to a Right to Be 
Forgotten. The en banc court specifically noted that “booking photographs 
often remain publicly available on the Internet long after a case ends,” 234 
writing specifically that the court’s earlier 1996 outlying decision 
favoring the release of mug shots was made pre-Google, when the court 
had likely failed to “account[] for Internet search and storage 
capabilities.”235 
Not surprisingly, given that language and those worries about the future 
impact of today’s information, the Sixth Circuit in 2016 joined other 
federal courts and decided that mug shots could be kept out of public 
hands when privacy interests outweigh public interests.236 Using words 
and ideas that suggested the court’s concern that “forgotten”237 
information that had “disappeared”238 would be revived to “haunt”239 an 
individual for “decades,”240 it sent the case back to the trial court to 
balance the private and public interests at stake.241 Such word choice 
suggested strong protection for most mug shots, put best in a Right to Be 
Forgotten-like context by a concurring judge: 
Twenty years ago, we thought that the disclosure of booking 
photographs, in ongoing criminal proceedings, would do no harm. 
But time has taught us otherwise. The internet and social media 
have worked unpredictable changes in the way photographs are 
stored and shared. Photographs no longer have a shelf life, and 
they can be instantaneously disseminated for malevolent 
purposes. Mugshots now present an acute problem in the digital 
age: these images preserve the indignity of a deprivation of 
liberty, often at the (literal) expense of the most vulnerable among 
us. Look no further than the online mugshot-extortion business. 
In my view, [the Sixth Circuit’s 1996 decision] . . . has become 
                                                     
233. Detroit Free Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 796 F.3d 649, 652 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
234. Id.  
235. Id. at 652 n.1. 
236. Detroit Free Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2016). 
237. Id. at 482 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989)). 
238. Id. 
239. Id. at 485. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
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“inconsistent with the sense of justice.” These evolving 
circumstances permit the court to change course.242 
Even the dissenting judges in the case, distressed at how the majority 
opinion had overturned longstanding case law and concerned that it had 
“deprive[d] the public of vital information about how its government 
works and [did] little to safeguard privacy,”243 suggested that a “sensible 
balance” might be achieved between “reputational concerns and the free 
flow of public information.”244 They then cited to two Right to Be 
Forgotten-like law-based considerations: one a proposed Georgia statute 
that would have required website owners to remove acquitted individuals’ 
mugshots from webpages and, the second, a Pennsylvania decision that 
suggested the false light tort—a privacy tort similar to defamation but 
with a focus on the offensiveness of the incorrect information rather than 
on its harm to reputation—would be appropriate should a mugshot of an 
individual whose criminal record had been expunged be published on the 
website bustedmugshots.com.245 In effect, then, the dissenting opinion in 
the Sixth Circuit en banc opinion, signed by seven federal appellate court 
judges, also makes a case for a Right to Be Forgotten. 
There are additional examples of Right to Be Forgotten-like outcomes 
within a criminal context in very recent decisions. The 2015 Pennsylvania 
case involving the man with a criminal record alleged to have been a part 
of the federal witness protection program is one.246 There, with regard to 
decades-old information about the man’s criminal past, the court 
suggested that the publication of such information had been done to harass 
the plaintiff and that it, therefore, was not protected.247 “Although courts 
justifiably fear that restrictions on publication may have a chilling effect 
on the disclosure of future information,” the court wrote, “the present case 
does not present a scenario in which the right to freedom of information 
is threatened.”248 Such information about one’s past was, instead, to the 
court’s mind, “personal, private, and illegal information that ha[d] no 
relation to any public concern.”249 The court ordered the information 
                                                     
242. Id. at 486 (Cole, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
243. Id. at 494 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
244. Id. 
245. Id.  
246. Hartzell v. Cummings, No. 150103764, 2015 WL 7301962, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 4, 
2015). 
247. Id. at *18. 
248. Id. at *17–18 
249. Id. at *18. 
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removed from websites, finding its relevance less important than the 
man’s interests in privacy. 
The year before, in the false light case noted by the Sixth Circuit dissent 
in the mugshots case,250 a Pennsylvania federal court had decided that a 
man whose mug shot was published on bustedmugshots.com and 
mugshotsonline.com had a potentially valid claim for false light even 
though he had in fact been arrested years before—an arrest that had been 
expunged.251 The website had argued in part that the accuracy of the mug 
shot and its release by authorities years earlier after the man’s arrest had 
made a false light claim impossible—after all, he had indeed been arrested 
and the mug shot was indeed that of the plaintiff—but the judge 
disagreed.252 “The questions here are questions of fact,” the court wrote, 
“and [the plaintiff’s claim for false light] . . . is not implausible.”253 
Outside the criminal context, recall the 2016 case that suggested that 
the investigation into a federal prosecutor’s alleged misconduct could be 
kept out of public hands.254 In that Freedom of Information Act case, the 
court specifically wrote that the former prosecutor “without 
question . . . has a strong interest in avoiding decades-old disclosures that 
would likely cause him professional embarrassment.”255 The passage of 
time, the court noted specifically, did not materially diminish the man’s 
substantial privacy interests.256 
In Toffoloni v. LFB Publishing Group,257 a case decided by the 
Eleventh Circuit in 2009, the court similarly gave support to principles 
underlying a Right to Be Forgotten. There, the court found a valid right-
of-publicity claim in old nude photographs of a female professional 
wrestler that had been published in Hustler magazine after her murder.258 
In doing so, the court specifically noted the importance of protecting 
present privacy interests in older truthful information about an individual: 
                                                     
250. Detroit Free Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478, 494 (6th Cir. 2016) (Boggs, J., 
dissenting). 
251. Taha v. Bucks Cty., 9 F. Supp. 3d 490 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
252. Id. at 494. 
253. Id. 
254. Bloomgarden v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2016 WL 471251 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2016); see also 
Bloomgarden v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 212 F. Supp. 3d 122, 125 (D.D.C. 2016), a later proceeding in 
which the court reiterates protection for the letter and suggests that there is negligible public interest 
in “decades-old agreements.” 
255. Bloomgarden, 2016 WL 471251, at *4 (emphasis added). 
256. Id. 
257. 572 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2009). 
258. Id. 
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[Hustler] would have us rule that someone’s notorious death 
constitutes a carte blanche for the publication of any and all 
images of that person during his or her life, regardless of whether 
those images were intentionally kept private and regardless of 
whether those images are of any relation to the incident currently 
of public concern. We disagree.259 
Instead, the court wrote, courts had consistently ruled that “there are 
timeliness . . . boundaries that circumscribe the breadth of public scrutiny 
to the incident of public interest.”260 In cases involving crimes, the court 
suggested that that might well be the period between the time the criminal 
is caught and when he faces justice in the courtroom.261 In other words, 
the court arguably and, if so, troublingly suggested that shortly after an 
individual is convicted or found not guilty, the matter could well no longer 
be of public concern.262 A reasonable timeliness boundary in the case 
before it, the court repeated throughout the opinion, would not include 
Hustler’s publication of photographs that “were at least twenty years old,” 
especially when the murder victim when alive had “sought destruction of 
all of those images.”263 A decision in favor of publication, the court 
suggested, would “open the door to [the publication of] any truthful 
secret” about an individual’s past or otherwise and that privacy here had 
greater value.264 
“‘[A] person who avoids exploitation during life,” the court wrote in 
Toffoloni, quoting an earlier court, “is entitled to have his image protected 
against exploitation after death just as much if not more than a person who 
exploited his image during life.’”265 In other words, the court suggests that 
those who have acted to protect their past during their lifetimes have 
privacy interests that continue into the present and even after death. 
                                                     
259. Id. at 1210. 
260. Id. (emphasis added). 
261. Id. 
262. The court wrote that during the:  
[P]endency and continuation of the investigation, and until such time as the perpetrator[s] of the 
crime may be apprehended and brought to justice under the rules of our society, the matter will 
continue to be one of public interest, and the dissemination of information pertaining thereto 
would not amount to a violation of [appellant’s] right of privacy. 
Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation omitted) (citing Tucker v. News Publ’g Co., 397 S.E.2d 
499 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)).  
263. Id. at 1211. 
264. Id. at 1212 (citing Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981)). 
265. Id. at 1213 (emphasis omitted) (citing Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change v. Am. 
Heritage Prods., 296 S.E.2d 697, 706 (Ga. 1982)). 
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Related protection for privacy rights in the past—especially as 
regarding information about the long-ago death of a relative—also appear 
in a recent California case. In 2012, the Ninth Circuit held that parents 
have “a constitutionally protected right to privacy over [a] child’s death 
images,” when those images had been taken decades before.266 There, a 
prosecutor who had handled a child’s murder case had kept the autopsy 
photographs. Years later, he gave one to a journalist doing a follow-up 
news story about the crime.267 “[T]his is the first case to consider whether 
the common law right to non-interference with a family’s remembrance 
of a decedent is so ingrained in our traditions that it is constitutionally 
protected,” the court wrote.268 “We conclude that it is.”269 The United 
States Constitution, the court explained, “protects a parent’s right to 
control the physical remains, memory and images of a deceased child 
against unwarranted public exploitation . . . .”270 Such protections were 
especially important, the court noted, “given the viral nature of the 
Internet, where [parents] might easily stumble upon photographs of [their] 
dead son on news websites, blogs or social media websites.”271 The court 
decided that future government officials could be liable for depriving 
surviving family members to their “substantive due process right to family 
integrity” and privacy interests should they reveal autopsy photographs, 
including decades-old photographs, in a similar way.272 
Other relevant examples include a 2005 Washington decision in which 
a plaintiff had a valid privacy claim in medical information that involved 
in part a medical condition diagnosed when he was a child, later leaked 
                                                     
266. Marsh v. Cty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012). 
267. Id. at 1152. 
268. Id. at 1154 (emphasis added). 
269. Id. 
270. Id. (emphasis added). 
271. Id. at 1155.  
272. Id. at 1154; see also Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal. Highway Patrol, 181 Cal. App. 4th 856, 864 
(2010) (“[A]s cases from other jurisdictions make plain, family members have a common law privacy 
right in the death images of a decedent, subject to certain limitations.”). Also relevant is Tatum v. 
Dallas Morning News, 493 S.W.3d 646, 663 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015). There, the court similarly held that 
parents had a valid defamation claim against a journalist who had reported that their son had 
committed suicide, and who had noted critically that the obituary suggested instead that the death was 
from a car accident. Id. at 652–53. Even though the underlying facts as presented in the publication 
were basically true, albeit critical of the grieving parents, the court sided with the parents who argued 
that they believed the suicide had been caused by the accident and that they had wanted to honor their 
son’s memory by not including “morbid details” or “overly scientific information” about his death. 
Id. at 663. In other words, the court gave the parents the ability to bring a defamation claim based 
upon their preferred understanding of the past, one that apparently did not align with police records, 
and one giving them at least some apparent right to forget the police assessment of how their son died. 
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by his employer;273 a 2010 Texas case in which the state supreme court 
held that state employees’ dates of birth can be protected as private 
information;274 and a 2014 Illinois decision in which the court found that 
students have privacy interests in the historical information in their 
student files.275 
In 2011, the Washington State Supreme Court justices wrote rather 
succinctly en banc that they were “not persuaded that a person’s right to 
privacy . . . should be forever lost because of media coverage.”276 Even 
though identifying information involving a police officer in an 
“unsubstantiated allegation of sexual misconduct” had been published in 
the media and more broadly, the court held that revelation of his identity, 
even though it named him in the opinion itself, would be “highly offensive 
to a reasonable person.”277 
Of at least some evidence of the potentially increasing viability and 
breadth of a Right to Be Forgotten in the United States, consider that 
throughout reported case history only thirty-two courts have quoted the 
somewhat surprising Restatement language that suggests that there is a 
privacy right in one’s past history that he would rather forget.278 Four of 
those cases, more than 10% of them, were decided in 2015 and later, and 
in each the language is not discounted but embraced as drawing a 
definitional line appropriate to privacy.279 In 2017, for example, a federal 
trial court in Kansas ruled against a former Wichita State vice president’s 
privacy claim that sprang from a public announcement about his 
impending termination.280 The court wrote that such employment-related 
information was “not the kind of private information [traditionally] 
entitled to . . . privacy . . . .”281 “[F]acts that are considered suitably 
private,” the court explained in contrast, involve sexual relations, 
                                                     
273. White v. Town of Winthrop, 128 Wash. App. 588, 116 P.3d 1034 (2005). 
274. Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Attorney Gen., 354 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2010). 
275. John v. Wheaton Coll., No. 2-13-0524, 2014 Ill. App. Lexis 1045 (Ill. Ct. App. May 20, 2014). 
276. Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 172 Wash. 2d 398, 412, 259 P.3d 190, 196 
(2011); see also United States v. Smith, 123 F.3d 140, 156 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that sealed briefs 
or closed court proceedings that may have implicated grand jury material could be protected from the 
press, and that newspapers had no constitutional or common law right to these materials).  
277. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 172 Wash. 2d at 413–15, 259 P.3d at 197–98. 
278. Research done in November 2017 (on file with author). 
279. Roman v. United Illuminating Co., CV146044689S, 2015 Conn. Super. Lexis 1096 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. May 12, 2015); Jane Does v. King Cty., 192 Wash. App. 10, 366 P.3d 936 (2015); Predisik 
v. Spokane Sch. Dist. No. 81, 346 P.3d 737 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). 
280. Robinson v. Wichita State Univ., No. 16-cv-2138-DDC-GLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis 83577 
(D. Kan. May 31, 2017). 
281. Id. at *16–17. 
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humiliating illnesses, and “some of [a man’s] past history that he would 
rather forget.”282 
It is important to note that several recent courts have explicitly rejected 
Right to Be Forgotten-like arguments. In 2015, the Second Circuit, for 
example, refused to find that a woman could bring privacy-based claims 
against online media that continued to report her arrest that had been, in 
effect, nullified.283 Connecticut’s erasure statute, the court wrote, “creates 
legal fictions” but “does not render historically accurate news accounts of 
an arrest tortious merely because the defendant is later deemed as a matter 
of legal fiction never to have been arrested.”284 And a federal trial court in 
New York that same year opened once-sealed documents that had been 
part of litigation five years before.285 “[T]here is no implication in the 
caselaw or in common sense why the passage of more than three years 
should disable a journalist from seeking [the] unsealing” of an otherwise 
sealed file, the court wrote.286 
Even so, a meaningful number of cases embrace the notion that 
individuals have a right to privacy in older, previously public information. 
Very likely, as reflected in some of the language above, the shift toward 
privacy in past information over publication rights is based in part upon 
judges’ growing worries about the longevity of information in today’s 
internet age. 
C. The Judicial Shift to Protect the Privacies of Life 
In 1975, in Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, the Supreme Court noted that it 
found the “strong tide running in favor of the so-called right of privacy” 
compelling.287 Two years later, in Whalen v. Roe,288 the Court wrote that 
it had special privacy concerns about the computerization of information 
and information storage. “We are not unaware,” the Justices explained, 
“of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of 
personal information in computerized data banks or other massive 
                                                     
282. Id. 
283. Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546 (2d Cir. 2015). 
284. Id. at 551. See also Lovejoy v. Linehan, 20 A.3d 274 (N.H. 2011), a case involving the 
revelation of a sheriff candidate’s annulled assault conviction. The court concluded that the annulled 
record was of public concern. Id. at 278. 
285. In re Pineapple Antitrust Litig., 04 md. 1628 (RMB)(MHD), 2015 US Dist. LEXIS 122438 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
286. Id. at *7. 
287. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 488 (1975). 
288. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
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government files.”289 Much of the stored information, the Justices noted 
specifically, is “personal in character and potentially embarrassing or 
harmful if disclosed.”290 
In other words, at the nation’s highest court at the start of the computer 
age, there was the sense that personal privacy was becoming increasingly 
vulnerable. Moreover, there were concerns about older, stored, 
embarrassing or deeply private information and what might be done with 
it should someone gain access. 
Forty years later, in 2014, when the Court expressed concerns about 
police access to the information contained in a cellular phone—calling the 
material stored there the “privacies of life”291—the shift toward privacy 
was even clearer. 
The United States Supreme Court is not alone in its worries about 
technology and its sensitivities regarding life’s privacies.292 In recent 
years, there seems to be a growing sense among many courts that the 
mounting vulnerability of privacy posed by modern technology and 
information-sharing demands stronger legal protection. This has led some 
courts to overcome traditional deference to journalists in deciding what 
should be considered “newsworthy” and to hold that individual privacy 
should be protected, even when the counterweight is the publication of 
truthful—and, arguably, newsworthy—information.293 
Two recent examples that show the courts’ growing confidence in 
deciding questions of newsworthiness involve public figures from the 
sports world. In both, the plaintiffs brought publication-of-private-facts 
lawsuits against publishers of certain medical information. In both, the 
public figures won the right to continue their privacy causes of action, 
despite defense arguments that the information at issue was newsworthy 
and, therefore, the cases warranted immediate dismissal. 
In the first, a reporter for ESPN tweeted a report that a New York 
Giants football player, Jason Pierre-Paul, had needed a finger amputation 
                                                     
289. Id. at 605. 
290. Id. The Court specifically expressed concern with “the unwarranted [intentional or 
unintentional] disclosure of accumulated private data.” Id. at 606. 
291. Riley v. California, __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).  
292. See Andrew Neville, Is It a Human Right to Be Forgotten? Conceptualizing the World View, 
15 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 157, 171 (2017) (arguing that the Right to be Forgotten, or at least the 
right to have one’s personal information delisted in search engine results, is a human right that is 
increasingly encroached upon due to modern technology; noting that “[t]he Internet has created a 
world where information is stored and shared even when international governments consider it to be 
irrelevant by statute”). 
293. For a fuller exploration of this topic, see AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW 
PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN A FREE PRESS (2015).  
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after an injury involving fireworks.294 The tweet included an image of the 
player’s hospital medical chart that confirmed the amputation.295 A federal 
trial court in Florida in 2016 found that Pierre-Paul had a potentially valid 
publication-of-private-facts claim: the medical chart was not publicly 
available, the court decided, and medical information itself is traditionally 
considered private.296 Even though the court recognized the news value in 
Pierre-Paul’s potentially disabling injury alone, it found that the use of a 
medical record to, in effect, prove the accuracy of the story could well 
push the information past the limits of public concern.297 
Both “common decency” and concern about the football player’s 
“feelings . . . and the harm that will be done to him by the exposure” were 
reasons the court gave for ruling as it did.298 Moreover, and key here, the 
court relied in part upon “federal and state medical privacy laws [that] 
signal that an individual’s medical records are generally considered 
private.”299 
The second case involved boxer Floyd Mayweather’s former girlfriend; 
she sued him for posting to social media the allegation that she had 
obtained an abortion before the couple split.300 A California appeals court 
in 2017 found that the information regarding the abortion itself was 
newsworthy, given that the couple was high-profile and that people would 
therefore be interested in the reason for their breakup.301 
Mayweather’s inclusion of a sonogram photograph, however, satisfied 
the basis for a publication-of-private-facts claim.302 “On this record,” the 
court wrote, “publishing those images served no legitimate public 
purpose, even when one includes entertainment news within the zone of 
protection.”303 Such a publication was, instead, “morbid and sensational 
prying into her private life” and therefore could be the basis for a 
                                                     
294. Pierre-Paul v. ESPN, No. 16-21155-Civ-COOKE/TORRES, 2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis 119597 
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2016).  
295. Id. at *3. 
296. Id. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1977)). 
299. Id. See also Swendrak v. Urode, B275175, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. Lexis 4010 (Cal. Ct. App. 
June 12, 2017) (upholding an $825,000 verdict in favor of man whose landlord had revealed to other 
tenants that police had placed him on a “psychiatric hold”). 
300. Jackson v. Mayweather, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
301. Id. at 249. 
302. Id. at 250. 
303. Id.  
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successful publication-of-private-facts claim.304 The court held that 
Mayweather’s repeated posts would support in part an intentional-
infliction-of-emotional-distress claim as well.305 
These, then, are not courts that are single-mindedly focused on First 
Amendment-related publication rights. Instead, both courts sided with the 
privacy interests of public figures in cases involving what even the courts 
considered newsworthy information and favored at least initially those 
interests over the publication of truthful information. 
A similar sensibility exists in court decisions around the nation. In 
2016, a federal court in New York, for example, rejected a request for 
certain information about prison inmates in a different case, suggesting 
that the requestor wrongly wanted “a piece of [the inmates’] criminal 
history.”306 “[C]onfidentiality interests cannot be waived through prior 
public disclosure or the passage of time,” the court advised.307 Courts in 
Hawaii and New York similarly ruled in favor of plaintiffs in their privacy 
lawsuits that referenced at least in part information from the past known 
to others.308 
A similarly inclined privacy-protective Ninth Circuit wrote in 2017 that 
no per se rule exists that suggests that “one cannot have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a conversation just because it occurs in 
public.”309 “The take-home message,” the court explained, “is that privacy 
                                                     
304. Id. at 251 (quoting Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 366 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010)). 
305. Id. at 257–58. 
306. Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 11 Civ. 203 (ARR) (VMS), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
46455 at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2016). 
307. Id. at *10 (citing Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 297 (2d Cir. 1999)); see also Muchnick v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 225 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that FOIA 
protects forgotten criminal history “even if scattered bits and pieces are in the public domain). 
308. Boelter v. Advance Magazine Publishers Inc., 210 F. Supp. 3d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (deciding 
that the plaintiff’s claim based upon the Michigan Preservation of Personal Privacy Act was valid 
over Conde Nast’s arguments that if the court the publisher liable for selling and acquiring the 
plaintiff’s personal data, newsgathering would be affected); Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. 
Queen’s Med. Ctr., 375 P.3d 1252 (Haw. 2016) (holding that patient records including historical 
medical information regarding “the most confidential and sensitive inquiries” are deserving of privacy 
and should not be produced in a third-party lawsuit); see also Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Paxton, NO. 03-
14-00801-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 3043, at *13 (Apr. 7, 2017) (noting in a privacy case involving 
the requested release of the identities of participants in a social science experiment that certain 
historical matters would be highly offensive if released and could well include “a claim for injuries 
from sexual assault, a claim on behalf of illegitimate children for benefits following their father’s 
death, a claim for pregnancy expenses resulting from failure of a contraceptive device, claims for 
psychiatric treatment of mental disorders following workplace injuries, claims for injuries to sexual 
organs, claims for injuries from an attempted suicide, and claims of disability caused by physical or 
mental abuse by co-workers”). 
309. Safari Club Int’l v. Rudolph, 862 F.3d 1113, 1125 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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is relative and, depending on the circumstances, one can harbor an 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a public location.”310 It 
held that a man had a valid privacy claim after an associate recorded their 
conversation at a public restaurant and posted it to YouTube.311 
That same year, a federal trial court in Massachusetts upheld the 
constitutionality of a state statute that prohibited secret recording, ruling 
against a “national media organization” that used “undercover 
newsgathering techniques” to secretly record and intercept 
communications in places “such as polling places, sidewalks, and hotel 
lobbies.”312 There too the court specifically highlighted privacy concerns 
in a way that echoed in part the 1890 law review article by Warren and 
Brandeis: 
Individuals have conversations they intend to be private, in public 
spaces, where they may be overheard, all the time—they meet at 
restaurants and coffee shops, talk with co-workers on the walk to 
lunch, gossip with friends on the subway, and talk too loudly at 
holiday parties or in restaurant booths. These types of 
conversations are ones where one might expect to be overheard, 
but not recorded and broadcast. There is a significant privacy 
difference between overhearing a conversation in an area with no 
reasonable expectation of privacy and recording and replaying 
that conversation for all to hear.313 
And in the case involving the hack of Ashley Madison users’ 
identifying information,314 the online dating service aimed at facilitating 
extramarital affairs successfully protected its customers’ personal 
information at trial over arguments that the information was already 
public because it had been posted online.315 The court explained that the 
matter “highlight[ed] the need to protect the integrity of the internet and 
make it a safer place for business, research and casual use” and, 
ultimately, to protect the victims of such privacy invasions.316 
                                                     
310. Id. at 1126. 
311. Id.  
312. Project Veritas Action Fund v. Conley, 244 F. Supp. 3d 256, 259 (D. Mass. 2017). 
313. Id. at 264. 
314. In re Ashley Madison Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., MDL No. 2669, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 57619 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2016). 
315. Id. at *19. 
316. Id. at *21; see also Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 68 (2009) 
(arguing that regulations are needed to limit the negative impacts of “online mob” activity and thereby 
promote a more “vibrant online dialogue”; noting that “although much obnoxious online activity is 
and should be protected, limiting online mobs’ ability to silence women, people of color, and their 
other targets will, in fact, enhance the most important values underlying the First Amendment”). 
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A decade ago, the Ohio State Supreme Court similarly embraced 
privacy over publication.317 “[T]he barriers to generating publicity are 
slight,” it wrote regarding the ease of publishing information on the 
internet, “and the ethical standards regarding the acceptability of certain 
discourse have been lowered.”318 It then recognized the false-light privacy 
tort for the first time, a tort that other states had rejected as being too 
similar to defamation but without its protections. “As the ability to do 
harm has grown,” the court explained, “so must the law’s ability to protect 
the innocent.”319 
These interests in privacy and concern about later availability of 
truthful but embarrassing information online are reflected in polls that 
show that most people in the U.S. favor at least in part a Right to Be 
Forgotten. A 2014 report showed that “[s]ixty-one percent of Americans 
believe some version of the right to be forgotten is necessary.”320 A later 
poll suggested that nearly nine out of ten people wanted the ability to 
remove past embarrassing information online.321 
It is not difficult to imagine these courts and these individuals and many 
others like them who have embraced the importance of privacy in past 
years322 favoring a plaintiff who asks for privacy against a publisher who 
has dredged up and published deeply private information from the past. 
D. Dahlstrom and a Right to Be Forgotten 
There is additional and surprising support for this judicial shift toward 
privacy in a 2015 decision by the Seventh Circuit, Dahlstrom v. Sun-
Times Media, LLC.323 The court’s opinion in Dahlstrom does not address 
a Right to Be Forgotten by name (although the privacy of birthdates was 
at issue in the case in part), but decides something fundamental to such a 
right: that those who publish private information that they have knowingly 
                                                     
317. Welling v. Weinfeld, 113 Ohio St. 3d 464, 2007-Ohio-2451, 866 N.E.2d 1051. 
318. Id. at 1058–59. 
319. Id. at 1059. 
320. U.S. Attitudes Toward the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’, SOFTWARE ADVICE (2014), 
http://www.softwareadvice.com/security/industryview/right-to-be-forgotten-2014/ 
[https://perma.cc/R6ND-VPCL]. The report also suggested that “[t]hirty-nine percent want a 
European-style blanket right to be forgotten, without restrictions” and “[n]early half of respondents 
were concerned that ‘irrelevant’ search results can harm a person’s reputation.” Id. 
321. Mario Trujillo, Public Wants ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Online, HILL (Mar. 19, 2015, 9:12 AM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/236246-poll-public-wants-right-to-be-forgotten-online 
[https://perma.cc/4S9K-FV69]. 
322. See numerous cases cited in GAJDA, supra note 293. 
323. 777 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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obtained from privacy-protected government files can be liable for 
invasion of privacy despite the underlying truth of the information. 
The Dahlstrom case, therefore, is important in two ways to any Right 
to Be Forgotten. First, it holds that a publisher can be liable for the truthful 
publication of what could well be described as innocuous personally 
identifiable information despite considerable First Amendment protection 
for more egregious publications in past Supreme Court jurisprudence.324 
Second, in doing so, the decision lends strong support to the argument that 
those who knowingly gather and publish information sealed by statute for 
privacy reasons can be and arguably should be liable in a privacy-based 
cause of action. This would include the possibility of a successful action 
brought by a person whose once-secret past was revealed. 
Dahlstrom concerned a Chicago Sun-Times news article that had 
criticized the inclusion of certain individual police officers in a police 
lineup, suggesting that investigators had chosen colleagues as ringers who 
would shift attention away from the politically-well-connected suspect in 
a death investigation.325 The article noted that the suspect—six-foot-three 
and 230 pounds—had looked “average-sized” compared to the larger 
officers who appeared in the lineup with him, even though witnesses to 
the fatality under investigation had described the perpetrator as the 
“tallest” and “biggest” person they had seen that night.326 
It was the article’s inclusion of accurate personally identifying 
information to which the police officers objected.327 One officer was 
described as six-foot-three and 245 pounds; another was identified as a 
forty-nine-year-old; a third was described as tattooed.328 The officers 
alleged that the published information proved that the newspaper had 
violated the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA)329 by 
knowingly obtaining and then publishing identifying characteristics from 
Illinois Secretary of State motor vehicle records, including “each officer’s 
birth date, height, weight, hair color, and eye color.”330 The DPPA makes 
it “unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain or disclose personal 
information[] from a motor vehicle record.”331 
                                                     
324. Id. at 953–54. 
325. Tim Novak and Chris Fusco, Daley Nephew Biggest Guy on Scene, but Not in Lineup, 
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Nov. 21, 2011, at 16. 
326. Id. 
327. Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 939. 
328. Id. 
329. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–25 (2012). 
330. Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 939. 
331. 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a). 
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After the trial court rejected the journalists’ motion to dismiss, the 
journalists argued in part on appeal that they had the right to publish 
truthful information about the officers that they had obtained from a 
government source; in making that argument, they relied in large part on 
foundational Supreme Court cases that protected the publication of 
government-sourced truthful information.332 The journalists argued, in 
effect, that Cox Broadcasting, Florida Star, and Bartnicki all supported 
them. 
The Seventh Circuit, however, rejected the newspaper’s First 
Amendment defense as had the trial court, writing in part that the 
newspaper had cited to “no authority for the proposition that an entity that 
acquires information by breaking the law enjoys a First Amendment right 
to disseminate that information.”333 The court explained that in each 
Supreme Court case cited by the newspaper—Cox Broadcasting, Florida 
Star, Bartnicki—“the press’s initial acquisition of sensitive information 
was lawful.”334 
Indeed, as explained earlier in this Article, the Dahlstrom court’s 
refusal to follow in a rote way generally media-protective Supreme Court 
precedent is not at odds with language in those older cases.335 Recall how 
the Court repeatedly emphasized the narrowness of its privacy-versus-
press decisions.336 Noting that the government had released the 
purportedly private information in most of these cases, the Court implied 
that if the press had acquired information through unlawful means, its 
right to publish could well diminish.337 
More specifically with regard to that line of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, the Seventh Circuit’s unanimous opinion suggested first 
that the Justices had never conferred on media any expansive 
newsgathering right, instead noting that the Court had decided that 
newsgatherers must abide by generally applicable laws despite the 
promise of press freedoms within the First Amendment.338 Second, the 
Dahlstrom court found that the government’s interests in deterring access 
                                                     
332. Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 950. 
333. Id. (emphasis added). 
334. Id.  
335. See section II.A. 
336. See discussion supra section II.A.1. 
337. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), discussed supra in section II.A.1. There, recall 
that the court specifically noted that it was a “still-open question” whether media could be liable for 
the publication of information that it had acquired “unlawfully,” in contrast with that it had acquired 
lawfully. Id. at 528. 
338. Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 946–47. 
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to the drivers license database and in protecting the privacy of individuals 
were important safety-related considerations sufficiently advanced by the 
statute’s prohibitions.339 Even though the topic of the article itself was 
important, the court decided, the value added by the inclusion of personal 
information was negligible.340 Therefore, this time, privacy won out over 
publication. 
On remand, the trial court described the Seventh Circuit’s Dahlstrom 
holding this way: the appeals court had decided that “the Sun-Times 
possessed no constitutional right, either to obtain the officers’ personal 
information from the motor vehicle records, or to publish the unlawfully 
obtained information.”341 
It is true that the Dahlstrom appeals court pointedly refused to “opine 
as to whether, given a scenario involving lesser privacy concerns or 
information of greater public significance, the delicate balance might tip 
in favor of disclosure.”342 Instead, the court wrote: 
We hold only that, where members of the press unlawfully obtain 
sensitive information that, in context, is of marginal public value, 
the First Amendment does not guarantee them the right to publish 
that information.343 
Note, however, that such a limitation is actually not so limited. Many 
news stories could be considered of marginal public value344 and unlawful 
behavior is not perfectly definable given the Dahlstrom facts in which the 
role the journalists played in acquiring the information is not adequately 
described. Moreover, note how the language in the quoted passage 
supports a Right to Be Forgotten. Certainly, “sensitive information” that 
is “of marginal public value” could well include information about an 
individual’s past, proved private because a court or a statute had sealed it 
                                                     
339. Id. at 954. 
340. Id. at 953. 
341. Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, Case No. 12 C 658, 2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis 134227 at 
*2–*3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2016). The court held that while there remained some question about the 
newspaper’s ability to gather the information, it granted the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the 
pleadings about the publication itself. Id. at *9. 
342. Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 954. 
343. Id. (emphasis added). 
344. Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation of the 
Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1076 n.230 (2009) (offering an example from a 2006 case in which 
“a federal district court was openly skeptical about journalists’ news choices in a defamation case in 
which it compared the ‘convincing’ public interest topic of consumer issues with news reports of 
‘celebrity marriages and divorces, waterskiing squirrels, exploding whales, and national anthem 
singing tryouts,’ refusing to accept the media defendant’s broad definition for ‘newsworthy’” (citing 
Englert v. MacDonnell, No. 05-1863-AA, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29361, at *20–21 (D. Or. May 10, 
2006))).  
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from public access on privacy grounds. If members of the press 
“unlawfully” obtain such information, then, in the Dahlstrom court’s own 
words, “the First Amendment does not guarantee them the right to publish 
that information” if it is “of marginal public value,”345 a determination that 
under the Dahlstrom facts appears to defy the news judgment of the 
journalists themselves. 
Take juvenile criminal records, for example, and the laws that prohibit 
public access to those that are sealed or expunged. Under Dahlstrom, it 
would seem that the knowing access and publication of such information, 
especially years-old information, could conceivably lead to liability if the 
“delicate balance” between privacy and public interest at issue weighs 
more heavily in favor of privacy as earlier Supreme Court precedent 
suggests that it might.346 Such information may have been long since 
forgotten by most and the public interest in it would arguably be negligible 
in many cases. The individual, moreover, would likely argue that he has 
a strong privacy interest in his juvenile criminal record, given the 
economic and emotional dangers of disclosure. Compare in contrast the 
information published by the Sun-Times regarding the police officers: 
birthdates, physical characteristics, and other identifying information that 
is arguably not private at all and without any seeming potential to harm 
the officer’s future livelihood other than through identifiability as an 
officer. Nonetheless, in Dahlstrom it was protectable on privacy grounds 
because a statute mandated as much. 
Any lawsuit based upon the publication of older, expunged criminal 
records seems a stronger argument for privacy protections—and a pro-
plaintiff outcome, therefore, appears at least possible under Dahlstrom. 
E. Right to Be Forgotten-Relevant Statutes 
Given Dahlstrom’s reliance on a privacy-based statute to punish 
newsgathering and publication by journalists, Right to Be Forgotten ideals 
in statutory law across the United States are relevant: statutes that protect 
truthful, older information on privacy grounds seemingly could, post-
Dahlstrom, become the basis for liability in privacy-focused lawsuits 
should the historical information be revealed by a publisher. 
Consider the relevance of such statutes to the two key parts of a privacy 
cause of action. The first is the distinction between what is public and 
what is private. If once-public information has been sealed, the argument 
would be that such information has become private, especially if the 
                                                     
345. Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 954. 
346. Id. 
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information is older and long forgotten. Second, if truthful information 
that is “morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake” 
and of no interest to a decent person exceeds the bounds of what is 
appropriate news,347 statutes that protect certain historic information can 
help establish what is morbid and sensational and outside decency 
standards. In this way, newsworthiness is, in part, some might argue, 
curated by legislatures that protect certain truthful information by placing 
it outside the bounds of what is properly revealed. Society has spoken, the 
argument would go, and certain information is therefore appropriately off 
limits. 
This is in part what occurred in the Jason Pierre-Paul case against 
ESPN described earlier.348 There, the court relied on “federal and state 
medical privacy laws. . . [that] signal that an individual’s medical records 
are generally considered private.”349 The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act, therefore, helped to establish that ESPN’s use of a 
medical chart was beyond the bounds of what was appropriate news. 
In other words, as some courts have suggested,350 forbidding access to, 
providing for the destruction of, or providing criminal liability for 
someone who releases particular historical information may provide a 
means for laws to force society to “forget” that information. By doing so, 
the argument would go, they also can help establish what is appropriately 
newsworthy, at least in some sense. 
It is clear that such statutes, of course, cannot draw the newsworthiness 
line in all circumstances. Consider, for example, the secrecy in years-old 
tax records, a subject highly relevant in 2018, given President Donald 
Trump’s continuing refusal to reveal his tax returns.351 Some who work at 
the Internal Revenue Service have access to politicians’ and celebrities’ 
current and older tax returns, and many journalists and members of the 
public would very much like to learn what is in them. 
And while news value seems absolutely clear in the situation involving 
President Trump, federal law mandates confidentiality of this older 
financial information. The Internal Revenue Code reads that no officer, 
                                                     
347. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. H (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
348. Pierre-Paul v. ESPN, Inc., Case No. 16-21156-Civ-COOKE/TORRES, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 119597 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2016). 
349. Id. at *3; see also Swendrak v. Urode, B275175, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4010 (Cal. 
Ct. App. June 12, 2017) (upholding an $825,000 verdict in favor of man whose landlord had revealed 
to other tenants that police had placed him on a “psychiatric hold”). 
350. See, e.g., Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546 (2d Cir. 2015). 
351. See, e.g., Billy House, “Trump Will Not Release Taxes; Senior Adviser Says People Don’t 
Care About Tax Returns Of First Billionaire President,” PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 23, 2017. 
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federal or state employee, law enforcement official, agency official, or 
anyone with access to tax returns “shall disclose any return or return 
information obtained by him in any manner.”352 Under Dahlstrom and 
Pierre-Paul, given these longstanding statutory privacy interests, the 
possibility exists that a court might find the revelation of tax returns in a 
case not involving a politician to be sufficiently private and insufficiently 
newsworthy to merit free press protections. 
Consider as a broader example Tennessee’s “Confidential Records” 
statute,353 one that suggests a right to privacy in much past historical 
information. The statute provides that medical records,354 military 
records,355 school records,356 children’s services records,357 motor vehicle 
records,358 mental health files,359 records that would identify those 
involved in executions,360 photographs of rape victims,361 among multiple 
others, are protected. All are “treated as confidential and shall not be open 
for inspection by members of the public.”362 Multiple additional states 
have similarly protective statutes.363 
These statutes do not promise a Right to Be Forgotten in any direct 
sense; they do not offer or even suggest Right to Be Forgotten invasion-
of-privacy causes of action by their language. But what they do promise 
is a clear level of confidentiality in certain records, up to total destruction 
of those records, and, given Dahlstrom, the very real possibility that 
someone could well sue on privacy grounds based upon them should such 
information be revealed. 
1. Right to Be Forgotten-Relevant Statutes and Children 
Perhaps the most privacy-protective of these statutes are those 
concerning the past lives of children, especially with regard to their 
criminal histories. In Tennessee and many other states, childhood criminal 
                                                     
352. I.R.C § 6103(a) (2012). 
353. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-504 (2017). 
354. Id. § 10-7-504(a)(1). 
355. Id. § 10-7-504 (a)(3). 
356. Id. § 10-7-504(a)(4). 
357. Id. § 10-7-504(a)(8). 
358. Id. § 10-7-504(a)(12). 
359. Id. § 10-7-504(a)(13)(A). 
360. Id. § 10-7-504(h)(1). 
361. Id. § 10-7-504(q)(1)(E). 
362. E.g., id. § 10-7-504(a). 
363. See MINN. STAT. § 626.556 Subd. 11c (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-216(1) (2017); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 7B-2901 (2017). 
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records are strongly protected.364 In Montana, a statute orders the physical 
sealing of juvenile criminal records when the individual turns eighteen,365 
and it contemplates the complete “destruction of records” of youth court 
records more generally.366 
In North Dakota, fingerprint records and photographs of an arrested 
child must be destroyed.367 After that, the statute mandates that the 
government act as if the record had never existed: 
Upon the final destruction of a file or record, the proceeding must 
be treated as if it never occurred . . . [and] [u]pon inquiry in any 
matter the child, the court, and representatives of 
agencies . . . shall properly reply that no record exists with 
respect to the child.368 
In Minnesota, state officials are forbidden from releasing juvenile 
offender records and from acknowledging that such records exist.369 There 
too juvenile records “must be destroyed” instantly or later, depending 
upon the case outcome and the severity of the crime.370 Photographs of 
children are to be destroyed when the children turn nineteen.371 Relatedly, 
if a school in Minnesota receives a disposition order from the police, that 
information “must be destroyed” when the student graduates and any data 
about the incident must be “delete[d].”372 In addition, a child’s blood 
samples and the child’s test results for certain disorders “must be 
destroyed.”373 
Consider too the privacy in many states surrounding the adoption 
process and how it, in effect, changes historical fact to ensure that certain 
individuals are forgotten. In Alabama, as in many states, once a child is 
adopted, a new birth certificate is issued containing the names of the 
adoptive parents and the original birth certificate is sealed.374 In Kentucky, 
the new birth certificate may not indicate the location of the hospital or 
                                                     
364. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-504(a)(8). 
365. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-216(1). 
366. Id. § 41-5-216(3). 
367. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-53(4) (2017). 
368. Id. § 27-20-54(2). 
369. MINN. STAT. § 299C.095 Subd. 1(b) (2017). 
370. Id. Subd. 2 (b)–(e). 
371. MINN. STAT. § 260B.171 Subd. 1(c) (2017). 
372. MINN. STAT. § 121A.75 Subd. 2(e), 3(e) (2017). 
373. MINN. STAT. § 144.125 Subd. 8(b) (2017). 
374. ALA. CODE § 26-10A-32 (2017). 
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any attending medical professional and any adoption information may not 
be disclosed by anyone with access to those “locked” files.375 
2. Right to Be Forgotten-Relevant Statutes and Adults 
There are statutes that protect similarly private information regarding 
adults, some of which order the total destruction of information. In South 
Carolina, for example, all photographs, videos, electronic files, and other 
evidence at issue in an eavesdropping or voyeurism case “must be 
destroyed” in order to protect the victim’s privacy.376 
In California, as in many states, a new birth certificate is issued when 
an individual requests a different name and gender; the new birth 
certificate must not refer in any way to any older name or gender.377 In 
2015, the state passed a law that forces websites to remove posts by 
teenagers who later regret what they’ve posted,378 a law with strong Right 
to Be Forgotten implications.379 Another more criticized California law 
forced websites such as IMDb to remove anyone’s birthdate if that person 
requested such a removal, allowing in effect the erasure of accurate 
historical information.380 In Mississippi, abortion records are sealed and 
disclosure of related information is a felony.381 In West Virginia, any 
information regarding certain doctors’ drug or alcohol dependency “shall 
be expunged from the individual’s historic record.”382 
Relatedly, and in line with cases described earlier in this Article, an 
adult’s criminal past is also at times protected. In Connecticut, criminal 
records are erased and any person in control of those records “shall not 
disclose to anyone their existence or any information pertaining to any 
                                                     
375. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.570 (West 2018). A court can order disclosure, however, under 
very limited circumstances. 
376. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-470(f) (2017). 
377. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103430 (West 2017).  
378. Privacy Rights for California Minors in the Digital World, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 
§ 22.1.22580 (West 2017).  
379. But see Lawrence Siry, Forget Me, Forget Me Not: Reconciling Two Different Paradigms of 
the Right to Be Forgotten, 103 KY. L.J. 311, 333–34 (2014) (discussing this California legislation in 
relation to the Right to Be Forgotten, but noting that it is rather limited in its applications, “given that 
the wording of the provision only seems to cover individuals who post material and request its 
removal before they turn eighteen”). 
380. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83.5 (West 2017). A federal trial court later preliminarily blocked its 
implementation on First Amendment grounds. Imdb.com v. Becerra, Case No. 16-cv-06535-VC, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30776 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2017). 
381. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-77 (2017). Abortion record confidentiality exists in multiple states. 
See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-445 (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-7.1 (2017). 
382. W. VA. CODE § 30-14-11a (2017). 
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charge” that was erased.383 There, any record of a crime later 
decriminalized, such as the crime of sodomy, shall be “physically 
destroyed.”384 In Massachusetts, material involving a police warrant must 
be destroyed after five years.385 In South Carolina, once a criminal record 
is expunged, the individual’s arrest records, bench warrants, mug shots, 
and fingerprints are kept under seal and then “must be destroyed and no 
evidence” be retained.386 Those who violate that law are guilty of a 
misdemeanor.387 There are similar provisions in Louisiana.388 In Florida, 
a law that will take effect in 2018 forces any websites that request payment 
for the removal of mugshots to remove a mugshot if the individual makes 
a request by certified letter.389 
Consider too statutes that protect photographs and other graphic 
information obtained during autopsies. In a preliminary draft of a Florida 
state law, the legislature called it a “public necessity” that much autopsy 
information be kept confidential, lest “highly sensitive depictions or 
descriptions of the deceased” cause surviving family “continuous” 
emotional injury, including “memory of the deceased.”390 In Michigan, 
there is a prohibition on public display of autopsy photographs.391 
In Minnesota, records from license plate readers must be destroyed 
after 60 days; the statute’s subtitle is “Destruction of data required.”392 
And, in Illinois, police body camera footage must be destroyed after 
ninety days.393 All of this material would, of course, indicate precisely 
where people were in the past, their interpersonal connections, and at 
times even what they said—and would help prove what had happened in 
the past, but also deeply implicate privacy. 
But perhaps the most interesting and relevant example is located in the 
federal statute that covers bankruptcy credit reporting. The U.S. Code 
mandates that no bankruptcy can appear on an individual’s credit report 
once a decade has passed.394 This means, in effect, that a credit agency is 
                                                     
383. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142a (2017). 
384. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142d; see also MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-105 (West 2017), 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101 (2017). 
385. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(N)(3) (West 2017). 
386. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-1-40(b)(1) (2017). 
387. Id. § 17-1-40(c)(4). 
388. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 973 (2017). 
389. S.B. 118, 2017 Leg. (Fla. 2017) (enacted June 16, 2017, to take effect in July 2018). 
390. H.B. 1083, 2001 Leg. (Fla. 2001). 
391. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2855a (2017). 
392. MINN. STAT. § 13.824 Subd. 3(a) (2017). 
393. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 706/10-20(a)(7)(B) (2017). 
394. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(1) (2012). 
10 - Gajda.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2018 11:16 AM 
2018] PRIVACY, PRESS, AND THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 253 
 
forced to forget about the historical fact of bankruptcy even though such 
information would likely be of significant interest to anyone who 
requested such a report. Instead, it seems, privacy protects the individual 
who has turned around his financially troubled life. 
That, at least in some small and partial way, reflects precisely what the 
European Court of Justice decided in 2014 when it ruled that a man’s ten-
year-old debt proceedings should be wiped off Google on privacy 
grounds: that individuals deserve a right to redemption that is only 
possible through a Right to Be Forgotten-like mandate. 
3. How Privacy-Protective Statutes Interact with a Right to Be 
Forgotten 
Given Dahlstrom, any one of these statutes that protects privacy by at 
times literally ordering the destruction of a source of older truthful 
information could become the basis for a Right to Be Forgotten-like 
publication-of-private-facts claim against media. 
Indeed, the New Hampshire Supreme Court suggested in 2016 in dicta 
that annulled arrests could perhaps be categorized as “files whose 
disclosure would constitute invasion of privacy” given Right to Be 
Forgotten-relevant statutory protection.395 And the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court that same year relied in part on a crime victims’ rights statute to 
withhold access to a training video that included the discussion of a long-
ago crime; in siding with the privacy of the victims, it explained that the 
“exposure of [the crime victims’] identities almost a decade after [the] 
events occurred” would lead to emotional trauma and suffering, even 
though the information was once public knowledge.396 
Finally, in 2014, in a case involving an ACLU request for prosecution 
data, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit linked 
statutory law and privacy rights. After citing a number of criminal history 
erasure statutes, it wrote: “we reject the . . . surrender of any reasonable 
expectation of privacy to the Internet—a surrender that would appear to 
result from a failure to distinguish between the mere ability to access 
information and the likelihood of actual public focus on that 
                                                     
395. Grafton Cty. Attorney’s Office v. Canner, 147 A.3d 410, 413 (N.H. 2016) (quoting the trial 
court). The court had decided that records of annulled arrests were not categorically exempt from 
public inspection. Id. “[O]ur decision today,” it wrote, “does not resolve the question of whether the 
records related to [the unnamed individual’s] arrest and prosecution ultimately will be available for 
public inspection.” Id. 
396. Democratic Party of Wisc. v. Wisc. Dep’t of Justice, 888 N.W.2d 584 (Wis. 2016). 
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information.”397 In other words, the court suggested that there is indeed 
privacy in older public information that is otherwise available on the 
internet—and that the statutes help provide support for the right to privacy 
of the individual. In even more relevant Right to Be Forgotten language, 
it added: 
Although the fact that such defendants were accused of criminal 
conduct may remain a matter of public record, they are entitled to 
move on with their lives without having the public reminded of 
their alleged but never proven transgressions.398 
The statutes highlighted in this section, each of which help to protect 
truthful information from the past in some key way, help support the 
notion that there is some historical information that deserves some level 
of protection from publication. Given Dahlstrom’s holding that a privacy-
focused statute can become the basis for an invasion-of-privacy claim 
even against the mainstream media, any one of these statutes could lead 
to a litigated Right to Be Forgotten-based clash between press rights and 
privacy rights. 
F. Hassell v. Bird and the Order to Remove 
Finally, there has been some suggestion in the United States that 
websites—even those not liable for publishing the offending 
information—might be forced to remove offending information from the 
internet. This too parallels at least in part the Google Spain decision. 
Consider the 2016 California appeals court decision that ordered Yelp 
to remove defamatory reviews a user had posted. Hassell v. Bird399 
involved a defamation claim filed by a law firm against a former client 
who had posted “factual inaccuracies and defamatory remarks” about its 
representation.400 The trial court judge eventually awarded the law firm 
nearly $558,000 and, as a part of its decision, ordered Yelp to remove “all 
reviews” by the defendant “and any subsequent comments” within seven 
days.401 Yelp argued in turn that the Communications Decency Act 
Section 230 protected it.402 Section 230 mandates that “[n]o provider or 
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
                                                     
397. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 750 F.3d 927, 933 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(emphasis in original). 
398. Id. 
399. 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 203 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
400. Id. at 209. 
401. Id. at 211. 
402. Id. at 224 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012)). 
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speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”403 Put simply, Section 230 protects websites that post 
information, such as comments and reviews, generated by non-affiliated 
others.404 
But the California appeals court rejected Yelp’s argument.405 
“Assuming, as Yelp has maintained, that Yelp played no role in the 
creation of that defamatory speech,” the court wrote, “an order directing 
Yelp to remove only those reviews that are covered by the injunction does 
not impose any liability on Yelp.”406 Here, the court reasoned, the plaintiff 
had not filed any claims against Yelp itself and the court had not found 
Yelp liable for the posts.407 Instead, it asked only that Yelp remove the 
defamatory information at issue: “[t]he removal order,” the court 
reasoned, “simply sought to control the perpetuation of judicially declared 
defamatory statements,” not liability for those statements, and, therefore, 
did not violate the CDA.408 
The California Supreme Court has agreed to review the decision.409 
Even if it is eventually reversed, however, it signals some judicial 
acceptance for removal orders despite traditionally strong CDA protection 
for websites. Even though the case involved defamatory speech, truthful 
but similarly tortious privacy-invading speech could one day become the 
subject of a similar court order. 
Moreover, the European Court of Justice will likely soon decide 
another Right to Be Forgotten case that could arguably give EU courts the 
power to order greater removal of what they deem to be privacy-invading 
information.410 In the case, France has argued that Google should be 
forced to remove links to older embarrassing information throughout the 
world, including searches done in non-EU countries like the United 
States; France has argued that one simply needs to use internet protocol 
address-masking software in Europe to access information that had been 
                                                     
403. Id.  
404. Id. 
405. Id. at 227. 
406. Id. at 226. 
407. Id. at 226–27. 
408. Id. at 226–27. 
409. Oral argument in the case is set for April 3, 2018. Oral Argument Calendar Los Angeles 
Session April 3 and 4, 2018, SUP. CT. CAL. (Mar. 8, 2018) http://www.courts.ca.gov/ 
documents/calendars/SAPR0318.PDF. [https://perma.cc/BR8A-6A7Q]. 
410. Alex Hern, ECJ to Rule on Whether ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Can Stretch Beyond EU, 
GUARDIAN (July 20, 2017, 5:19 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/20/ecj-
ruling-google-right-to-be-forgotten-beyond-eu-france-data-removed [https://perma.cc/K4Q7-6K 
ZK]. 
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ordered removed there and that such a broad power of removal is, 
therefore, needed.411 
Given these arguments and this continuing level of court interest, the 
Right to Be Forgotten has the potential to continue to expand 
internationally. 
III. THE RIGHT SORT OF RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN: A 
CLEARER FOCUS ON NEWSWORTHINESS 
Recall that when the European Court of Justice decided that individuals 
have a Right to Be Forgotten by recognizing that some information about 
one’s past should remain private and by forcing search engines like 
Google to remove certain links about what it considered the irrelevant 
past, commenters were often skeptical that such a Right could ever 
constitutionally exist in the United States.412 This Article warns that the 
Right to Be Forgotten in a normative sense has both significant historical 
and modern support here. 
This Article also warns that Right to Be Forgotten sensibilities will 
become increasingly tempting to judges who find a growing need for 
privacy protections today—a time in which hurtful truthful information 
about individuals can arguably be kept forever in computerized memory 
and can be made available anytime with a click. For example, not long 
after the European Court of Justice decision, one judge opined that, that a 
Right to Be Forgotten in the United States could effectively work to 
punish the privacy-invading information that would otherwise be 
protected by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act,413 the law 
described in the previous section414 that nearly uniformly protects internet 
publishers from liability for others’ posts. 415 He may not be correct in a 
legal sense, given the broad nature of CDA protection, but his excitement 
about a workaround indicates not only a desire among some judges for 
lessened protection for publishers but also the sense that a Right to Be 
Forgotten has merit in the United States. 
                                                     
411. Id.  
412. For a detailed comparative examination of notions of privacy in the U.S. and Europe, see 
James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 
1151 (2004). 
413. Mike Masnick, NY Judge Laments the Lack of a ‘Right to Be Forgotten’; Suggests New Law 
Fix That, TECHDIRT (Dec. 23, 2014, 10:27 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141220/ 
07184429490/ny-judge-laments-lack-right-to-be-forgotten-suggests-new-laws-fix-that.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/Y36B-W3X8]. 
414. See supra section II.F. 
415. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (2012). 
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The Right is indeed tempting. Science has proved, for example, that 
young people’s brains do not fully mature until long after most create 
social media accounts on which some post personal information that could 
later be of embarrassment; many seemingly believe that no one but friends 
will be interested readers.416 As noted in a preceding section,417 we often 
protect statutorily older criminal and other records through sealing or 
through total destruction, recognizing that preventing access to such 
material gives an individual the ability to right the wrongs of a past life 
with at least partial assurance that such information is strongly protected 
by the state. It may seem a strong argument that what has once been made 
public on the internet can no longer be private, but one need only read of 
the suicides of young people when privacy-intrusive videos become 
public418 to recognize that the law must ensure that some material is never 
seen again. 
Consider the dangers that a Right to Be Forgotten presents to freedom 
of the press, however. If one’s long-past criminal history is in fact private, 
a blanket Right would arguably give a budding politician the ability to 
hide the past, not only by preventing access to relevant records, but by 
threatening a lawsuit should a publication wish to report what those 
records contain. If Cox Broadcasting, Florida Star, and Bartnicki are read 
broadly enough and if the information is deemed private enough, it would 
not matter that the publisher had acquired the information legally, as long 
as a court found such information to be private. 
A Right to Be Forgotten without clear limits therefore, gives too much 
power to the individual’s privacy interests over the interests of the public 
and the freedom of the press to report key information about the powerful. 
I very strongly favor press interests over privacy interests in these 
clashes because I understand both that news can be emotionally painful 
and that ethical journalists work hard to balance effectively publication 
with the privacy rights of individuals. Even so, given the unfettered 
publishing ability of those without ethics constraints, there seems to be 
                                                     
416. I have previously described a teenager who freely identified herself by name and address and 
then proceeded to post medical and other deeply personal information on a message board for college 
hopefuls. When her peers suggested that she not be so open, she confidently suggested that no one 
else would be reading. It was only after her college counselor suggested that she leave the message 
board that she stopped posting. For related discussion of social media, see Elizabeth A. Kirley, Can 
Digital Speech Loosen the Gordian Knot of Reputation Law?, 32 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 171 
(2015) and Roberta Studwell, The Notion and Practice of Reputation and Professional Identity in 
Social Networking: From K-12 Through Law School, 25 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 225 (2016). 
417. See supra section II.E. 
418. See, e.g., Jamie Schram, Beauty Kills Herself After Sex Tape Goes Viral, N.Y. POST (Sept. 15, 
2016, 1:29 PM), https://nypost.com/2016/09/15/beauty-kills-herself-after-sex-tape-goes-viral/ 
[https://perma.cc/4B7H-DHR9]; Ian Parker, The Story of a Suicide: Two College Roommates, a 
Webcam, and a Tragedy, NEW YORKER, Feb. 6, 2012, at 37. 
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increasing need for some level of privacy protection that recognizes and 
supports human dignity interests. This lends strong support for a 
balancing test that gives substantial and nearly all-powerful weight to 
press interests but still acknowledges the very real harm that can come 
from certain truthful revelations. 
Indeed, there is some support for this sort of balance even at the highest 
levels of journalism. After the Right to Be Forgotten decision from the 
European Court of Justice, the New York Times editorial board suggested 
not that the Right be flatly rejected in the United States, but that any 
adoption of such a Right be tempered: 
The desire to allow individuals to erase data that they no longer 
wish to disclose is understandable. For example, there are good 
reasons to let people remove embarrassing photos and posts they 
published on social media as children or young adults. But 
lawmakers should not create a right so powerful that it could limit 
press freedoms or allow individuals to demand that lawful 
information in a news archive be hidden.419 
The New York Times is correct, of course, that any Right to Be 
Forgotten should necessarily be limited. And its suggestion that the focus 
be on “lawful” information contained within a “news archive” seems to 
suggest that even it agrees that some illegally obtained, not newsworthy 
stored material should be subject to removal from the internet. 
Recall how that idea at least in part parallels in a normative sense the 
language of the Restatement and its balance between the right to privacy 
and the right of the press to publish newsworthy information. Much of 
liability there is dependent upon when the event at issue occurred, what it 
involved, and who it concerned: Restatement authors suggest that when 
the publication becomes “morbid and sensational prying . . . for its own 
sake,” liability is appropriate because such information has no true news 
value;420 that some historical information, even about a past crime, has 
privacy protection; and that those in the public eye are less deserving of 
privacy.421 
In any Right to Be Forgotten analysis, then, a definition for 
newsworthiness that considers those when-what-who questions 
necessarily forces courts to balance competing interests—privacy and 
press—and not decide categorically that all long ago crimes and other 
                                                     
419. Editorial, Ordering Google to Forget, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2014, at A26. 
420. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. H (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
421. Id. 
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historical information are due privacy or that all revelations about the past 
are protected because of press freedom. 
Importantly, these are the same sorts of when-what-who questions 
frequently asked by journalists to help gauge the news value of historical 
information.422 When did the historical incident occur? The greater the 
length of time between the past event and present day, usually the less 
newsworthy the matter.423 What did the historical incident entail? The 
privacy-relevant nature of the information at issue matters, given that 
journalism’s ethics codes dictate that some things, such as graphic sexual 
information, are nearly universally off-limits.424 Who is the person 
involved? The status of the individual at issue can dictate the level of 
invasiveness of coverage, with private individuals given greater 
protection than public figures who are accustomed to, and at times strive 
for, the limelight.425 
Consider too the Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics and 
its section titled “Minimize Harm” as additional when-what-who 
guidance.426 The section begins by encouraging journalists to weigh the 
“public[] need” of certain information against the “harm or discomfort” 
that might be brought should the information be revealed.427 “Weigh the 
consequences of publishing or broadcasting personal information,” the 
Code later advises.428 It also distinguishes between those who are in the 
public eye and those who are not, suggesting that “private people have a 
greater right to control information about themselves than public figures 
and others who seek power, influence or attention.”429 Perhaps most 
relevant here, it also suggests that journalists “[c]onsider the long-term 
implications of the extended reach and permanence of publication.”430 
In other words, ethical journalists, in their quest to “treat[] sources, 
subjects, colleagues and members of the public as human beings 
                                                     
422. See JAMES G. STOVALL, JOURNALISM: WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND HOW (Karon 
Bowers & Molly Taylor eds., 2005). 
423. See id. at 5–6 (discussing timeliness as an important factor that determines whether a story is 
newsworthy). 
424. See id. at 473–74 (discussing the journalistic ethical code regarding the privacy concerns of 
the individuals journalists cover). 
425. See id. at 6 (discussing the prominence of the subject as an important factor that determines 
whether a story is newsworthy). 
426. SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y PROF’L JOURNALISTS (Sept. 6, 2014, 4:49 PM), 
https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp [https://perma.cc/3H45-TKXV]. 
427. Id. 
428. Id. 
429. Id.  
430. Id.  
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deserving of respect,”431 must balance the when, the what, and the who, 
not only in drafting a story, but in deciding whether to publish the story 
in the first place. It is only when that balance tips in favor of publication 
over privacy—recall the “public[] need” language in the “Minimize 
Harm” section432—that journalism ethics would support the story. 
This is not to suggest that there is or should be or can ever be a bright-
line journalism ethics test that courts should use should they begin to 
embrace even more clearly and strongly a Right to Be Forgotten—or even 
that such ethics language should ever be used by courts. Such a use would 
decidedly chill an already economically constricted and restricted press 
corps. Moreover, as I have written previously, journalism’s ethics 
provisions are meant to be aspirational and often times conflict, given the 
highly fact-dependent and malleable nature of news judgment; they 
certainly are not rules that force certain behaviors and they can be 
extremely dangerous as a limitation on press freedoms if used by a court 
as a basis for liability.433 But it is of at least some small interest that, in 
certain cases, the privacy protection suggested by the Restatement aligns 
nearly exactly with that suggested by journalists themselves. 
It is also of some interest that the Associated Press Stylebook, a bible 
of sorts for journalists, instructs users in part that the publication-of-
private-facts tort has newsworthiness considerations and then includes 
two examples that involve Right to Be Forgotten-like claims: one 
springing from Melvin v. Reid, the case involving the once-prostitute who 
had changed her ways, and a second involving a published photograph of 
an accident scene taken twenty months earlier and featuring a child 
victim.434 In that second example, the authors suggest the court found 
liability for publication because “the child was no longer ‘in the news.’”435 
Describing the legal line of newsworthiness as “not always clear” in 
cases involving the use of historical material, the authors of the Stylebook 
suggest that there must be some connection between the private fact that 
is revealed and the news value inherent in the story in order for the 
journalist to escape liability: 
Even in the context of a report on a plainly newsworthy topic, the 
disclosure of a highly embarrassing private fact may give rise to 
a claim for invasion of privacy if the facts are not logically related 
                                                     
431. Id. 
432. Id. 
433. Gajda, supra note 344. 
434. ASSOCIATED PRESS, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS STYLEBOOK 2015 AND BRIEFING ON MEDIA 
LAW 358–59 (David Minthorn, Sally Jacobsen & Paula Froke eds., 2015). 
435. Id. 
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to the matter of public concern. For example, disclosure of the 
intimate sexual practices of a celebrity might support a claim for 
invasion of privacy if it were unrelated to any newsworthy report 
and amounted to prying into someone’s life for its own sake.436 
The information in the Stylebook is meant to be a primer on media law 
for journalists, and is certainly not any sort of liability admission, but it is 
nonetheless interesting that Right to Be Forgotten-like decisions are those 
highlighted and chosen out of many to help guide news coverage. 
But this nod from journalism toward this sort of privacy requires a 
strong counterbalance. A protected and therefore vigorous press promotes 
public knowledge and ultimately democracy through ambitious 
reporting;437 journalists need solid protection all the more in the current 
climate in which President Trump has condemned mainstream, highly 
ethical journalism as “fake news.”438 
A newsworthiness argument that I have made previously has some 
value here.439 First, I have argued that any truthful publication—
information that would be at the core of any Right to Be Forgotten-type 
claim—should be presumed newsworthy.440 Such a presumption would 
necessarily limit publishers’ liability in publication-of-private-facts and 
similar tort cases and make it easy for them to win on an a motion to 
dismiss. 
Liability would be possible and a jury would therefore hear only those 
“truly exceptional cases,” in which a judge believed that a reasonable jury 
could in fact find that “the degradation of human dignity caused by the 
disclosure [had] clearly outweighed the public’s interest in the 
disclosure.”441 Under such a test, successful privacy lawsuits would spring 
                                                     
436. Id. 
437. See Robert Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the Right to Be Forgotten, 
and the Construction of the Public Sphere 73 (Apr. 15, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
the author) (providing a historical overview of the role of the press in our democracy and noting that 
“[e]very democratic state extends constitutional protections to the media ‘not for the benefit of the 
press so much as for the benefit of all of us. A broadly defined freedom of the press assures the 
maintenance of our political system and an open society’” (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 
389 (1967))).  
438. See, e.g., Louis Nelson, Trump Again Attacks New York Times as ‘Fake News Joke!’, 
POLITICO (June 28, 2017, 7:34 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/28/donald-trump-
twitter-media-fake-news-240036 [https://perma.cc/W6L9-47JU?type=image]. 
439. Gajda, supra note 293. 
440. Id. at 233.  
441. Id. For other approaches to these questions, see, e.g., Sonja R. West, The Story of Us: 
Resolving the Face-Off Between Autobiographical Speech and Information Privacy, 67 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 589, 589–90 (2010) (arguing that courts should place a greater focus on the “offensiveness” 
element of the publication of private facts tort in determining whether speech deserves First 
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only from the publication of intensely private material traditionally kept 
private because of a strongly intimate nature or deeply personal focus—
information such as graphic depictions of sexual activity, nudity, and 
deeply private and highly sensitive medical information, for example.442 
Language from the Seventh Circuit’s Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.443 
decision is helpful here: privacy should protect only “those intimate 
physical details the publicizing of which would be not merely 
embarrassing and painful but deeply shocking to the average person 
subjected to such exposure.”444 
A Right to Be Forgotten-based privacy tort claim would therefore 
rarely be successful under such a test, given that all truthful information—
including information that is older and non-public—would be presumed 
newsworthy.445 It would only be in that exceptional case in which the 
dignity interests of the plaintiff clearly outweighed the public interest in 
the published material that the plaintiff would have the ability to take his 
Right to Be Forgotten-based claim to a jury and perhaps win.446 
Moreover, this sort of pro-publication test would be nearly 
insurmountable for a public official, given that privacy law already allows 
deeper inquiry into such an individual’s private life. 
There will be difficult Right to Be Forgotten-relevant cases, however. 
Consider, for example, the Austrian woman who is said to have sued her 
parents for posting on social media multiple naked images of her while 
                                                     
Amendment protection) and Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy 
Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 975–76 (2003) (arguing that courts should draw 
an analogy between these questions and the law of evidence, in which some information is admissible 
for certain purposes but not others; thereby positing that in determining the propriety of disclosures 
of information, courts should examine the purpose for which the disclosure is being made).  
442. Gajda, supra note 293. For a somewhat different take on the matter, see Ioanna Tourkochoriti, 
Speech, Privacy, and Dignity in France and in the U.S.A.: A Comparative Analysis, 38 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP L. REV. 217, 253 (2016) (noting the problematic nature of these determinations of 
what is private because “[t]he legal category of ‘highly offensive’ facts creates difficulties of 
interpretation concerning concepts to be determined by the judge ad hoc”). 
443. 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993). 
444. Id. at 1234–35. 
445. Consider here the persuasive language in Haynes v. Knopf, that favors publication over 
privacy: “[p]ainful though it is for the [plaintiffs] to see a past they would rather forget brought into 
the public view, the public needs the information conveyed by the book [at issue in the case] in order 
to evaluate the profound social and political questions that the book raises.” Id. at 1233. That case 
involved the publication of somewhat mundane but otherwise not publicly known information, 
including alcohol use and spending practices, that the author used to illustrate in a journalistic sense 
what the court called the urban ghetto. 
446. There are additional nuances important to the question here to be sure. Any Right to Be 
Forgotten would necessarily involve information that was in fact private and not publicly known or 
there could be no privacy claim.  
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she was growing up.447 In the United States, parents have posted personal 
and potentially harmful information about their children, including mental 
illness diagnoses that could affect their later employment and life plans.448 
When those children become adults, should they have the ability to sue 
should someone reveal this once-public information? Do these now-
adults, who had no control as children over the revelations by their 
parents, have the right to erase this truthful but potentially harmful 
information?449 Should they, in effect, have a Right to Be Forgotten? 
While these questions and their answers may be difficult, what is clear 
is that there is support for some sort of a Right to Be Forgotten in privacy 
jurisprudence and statutory law in the United States that could 
conceivably help them win such a case. 
Given that, a weighted balance between these important and competing 
interests—one that strongly supports news judgment and journalism itself 
by presuming the newsworthiness of truthful information but also protects 
privacy in exceptional cases—is one suitable answer.450 
CONCLUSION 
In 2015, the Ninth Circuit wrote in a copyright case that a Right to Be 
Forgotten “is not recognized in the United States.”451 This Article has 
argued that that widely assumed conclusion is wrong. The Right to Be 
Forgotten—the right to have some level of privacy in some parts of one’s 
past—exists in a normative sense, if not by name, by strong implication 
in the United States in common law, in the Restatement, and in statutes. 
And it has since the early 1800s. 
                                                     
447. Ashley May, 18-Year-Old Sues Parents for Posting Baby Pictures on Facebook, USA TODAY 
(Sept. 16, 2016, 11:11 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2016/09/16/18-year-
old-sues-parents-posting-baby-pictures-facebook/90479402/ [https://perma.cc/8VG7-6JBG]. 
448. Adrienne LaFrance, The Perils of ‘Sharenting’, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/babies-everywhere/502757/ 
[https://perma.cc/2RBV-KL6T] (noting that “[s]omeone might blog about a child’s medical condition 
as a way to seek or offer support, or to raise crucial funds for health care”). 
449. For a greater exploration of this issue, see Stacey B. Steinberg, Sharenting: Children’s Privacy 
in the Age of Social Media, 66 EMORY L.J. 839 (2017) (examining the inherent conflict between 
parents’ rights to free speech and children’s present and future interest in privacy and control of their 
digital identities and exploring potential legal solutions to this conflict). 
450. Such a balance may value press rights too strongly for some, but consider one very troubling 
alternative that favors privacy too strongly. In 2016, an Italian court attempted to ensure even greater 
privacy in the past by ordering that news stories expire from online databases after a period of two 
years. Athalie Matthews, How Italian Courts Used the Right to Be Forgotten to Put an Expiry Date 
on News, GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2016, 4:12 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/ 
sep/20/how-italian-courts-used-the-right-to-be-forgotten-to-put-an-expiry-date-on-news 
[https://perma.cc/K73C-CWZ5]. 
451. Garcia v. Google, Inc. 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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The question now is how to cabin a Right to Be Forgotten effectively 
in a way that strongly and nearly always supports press freedoms but also 
recognizes those very limited times in which exposure of the past 
implicates individual privacy in a significant way. A balancing test that 
presumes newsworthiness except in very rare cases respects the privacy 
and dignity of the individual, and prevents a debilitating chilling effect on 
journalism’s truthful reporting. 
 
